A Crown That Seldom Kings Enjoy: Assessing Pop’s Performance
Originally I was going to do a series of posts breaking down Pop’s coaching performance as it evolved (or devolved) over the course of the season but I decided a chronological take on the matter would involve a fair amount of unnecessary narration, etc. So let’s just tackle the achievements, criticisms, and myths (yes, I think a few of the criticisms are in fact myths) surrounding Gregg Popovich’s season one at a time.
The Development and Minutes of George Hill
I agree with the general consensus regarding Pop’s management (or mis-management) of George Hill. As we discussed in the lead up to the playoffs, more minutes and a more narrowly defined role would have done wonders for Mr. Hill.
Pop made a bit of a mea culpa by inserting Hill back into the lineup as our first round series drew to a close, and Hill took advantage of the opportunity. In games 4 and 5 you could argue he was the third best Spur on the floor, behind Tony Parker and Tim Duncan. As we have come to expect, he played excellent on-ball defense and made swift, accurate rotations. He also made confident but humble decisions with the ball in his hands: He took (and often made) shots when open but the urgency of the moment never pushed him into a state of over-aggression.
The real question I have is why Pop so completely mischaracterized Hill’s mental toughness. Pop directly cited Hill’s confidence as a reason for (initially) benching Hill for the postseason. But, all season long, when Hill was asked to perform a task suited for someone beyond his experience or ability, he performed excellently.
When Parker went out with an ankle injury early in the season, Hill rose to the occassion. When asked to cover Kobe in the closing minutes of a tight Spurs-Lakers game, Hill did as fine a job as anyone ever does slowing Bryant. And when, having not played meaningful minutes in a few weeks, Hill was asked to play 30+ minutes for a team on the brink of playoff elimination, He performed wonderfully.
Pop knows things I don’t know. I have never spoken with George Hill. During the season, Pop speaks with him daily. Without a doubt Pop has a better read on the internal state of Hill than I do. But that is why I am so confused. I experienced a fair amount of cognitive dissonance when I read Pop’s quotes and then watched Hill play. This is less so a critique as it is the acknowledgment of a conundrum.
Pop’s “Preference” for Veterans
This is the first “myth” regarding Popovich’s performance this season. Well, it isn’t so much a myth as a mischaracterization. Pop does prefer veterans (and their accompanying intangibles) to younger players (and their athleticism). And I think it is completely valid for Spurs’ fans to say their should be a greater balance between the two. But this is a criticism for Gregg Popovich, Executive Vice-President of Basketball Operations, not Gregg Popovich, Head Coach.
My point is, aside from late in the season when Pop gave Vaughn minutes over Hill, when did he stubbornly play a veteran player in place of a younger player? When he inserted Matt Bonner (29) into the starting lineup over Kurt Thomas (36) and Farbicio Oberto (34)? Or when he started Roger Mason (28) over Bruce Bowen (37) for most of the season?
Don’t get me wrong: Pop can be stubborn. He likes who likes. And I often get frustrated when he, somewhat randomly, seems inflexible (which I’ll address at length in a moment). But I am not convinced criticizing his ageism is appropriate when discussing his rotational decisions. This bias seems more evident when analyzing the role Pop plays in acquisitions and extensions.
Drew Gooden vs. Matt Bonner
Speaking of Pop’s inflexibility: I am frustrated with amount of minutes Matt Bonner saw during the postseason and, in conjunction, with the limited minutes Drew Gooden saw. Their relative contributions on both ends of the floor leave me feeling this way, but I’d like to focus on what each brings to the Spurs’ offense.
Drew Gooden has an array of post moves. Gooden has the size and athleticism to position himself deep in the post consistently. Once stationed, he can employ a variety of fakes and quick steps to move his defender further out of position. When receiving the ball on the block, he is a reliable scorer. He is overconfident in his mid-range jumper but when he floats out to mid-range he has a surprisingly quick first step and, when he chooses to, can beat his man off the dribble along the baseline.
Matt Bonner can shoot 3-pointers.
I’m employing a bit of visual hyperbole but I think you understand my point. Gooden can create his own shot, and can do so at a place on the floor where the Spurs are in dire need of point production: At the rim. Bonner is fundamentally a catch-and-shoot guy on a team full of catch-and-shoot guys.
As the season wore on, it became painfully clear that the Spurs were over-reliant on their outside shooting. When we acquired Drew Gooden, we raised the number of players who can consistently score in the paint from 2 to 3. That number is still too small, but that is no reason to make it even smaller by relegating one of those three to the bench. (Gooden played 8 minutes in Game 4. In Game 5 he received a DNP-CD.)
I haven’t even touched upon the defensive end of the court, where I think Gooden would be more productive as well. Neither are strong defenders but Gooden’s rebounding ability and sheer size made him a more valuable member of the defense, even if he had yet to master the Spurs’ complicated defensive sets.
Bowen’s Minutes
After Bowen’s played well during the playoffs, some people have said Pop should have been playing him in Finley’s stead throughout the season. Personally, I am fine with the way Pop handled Bowen’s minutes. Back in March I suggested Pop use Bowen in a surgical manner, and to some extent, that is exactly what he did.
At 37, Bowen couldn’t be expected to play extended regular season minutes and be a reliable contributor once the playoffs arrived. But Pop was confident that, after years of dedicated service, Bowen could be inserted back into the lineup at a moments notice and perform at a high level. And Pop was right.
You could argue that had Bowen seen more court time (in particular Michael Finley’s minutes) the Spurs would have performed better down the stretch and possibly ended up with a higher seed. But could he have continued to play at such a high level during the playoffs? In this instance I think it makes sense to defer to the trainer and coaching staff and their more detailed knowledge of Bowen’s stamina.
The Fluctuating Rotation
On the surface, this may seem like one of Pop’s more glaring failures: After Ginobili was permanently shut down, Pop never settled on a rotation (one of the only aspects of the game over which he has practically total control). But I think Pop’s struggles managing the rotation shine light on a deeper problem: No matter how you organized this group of players (sans Ginobili) they were going to be unable to win.
I think the previous section on Bowen’s minutes and Pop’s preference for veterans hint at this as well. And as I argued regarding Pop’s ageism, you can point fingers at Exec. V.P. Pop but blaming Coach Pop may be unjustified
At the time, I was critical of Pop’s refusal to settle on a rotation because I felt that even our players’ limited abilities would be put to better use if their minutes on the floor were normalized. But in retrospect, I can’t blame him for being slightly experimental all the way til the end.
The struggle to find a back-up point provides a telling microcosm for the broader rotational problems we faced.
Heading into the season, we had 4 players who could potentially play back-up point: Jacques Vaughn, Manu Ginobili, Roger Mason, and George Hill. On paper, our backcourt was a point of pride, not a concern. But as the season unfolded, and injury struck, the position began to spin slightly out of control.
Despite Hill’s tremendous upside, he has yet to develop into a decent passer. Mason, although he has above average court vision for a shooting guard, does not possess the ball-handling skills to play the 1. And at this point in his career, Jacques Vaughn does not possess anywhere near the athleticism or ability to honestly deserve court time on an NBA team. You can blame Hill’s lack of development on Pop (had he committed to making Hill into a point, Hill could have been ready to fill the role come Mid-April) but that is a different concern than the way he managed the rotation in March and April.
So Pop kept adjusting, mixing this frontcourt with that backcourt, having this forward picking and rolling while this guard curled around the screen. And all the while, it never clicked. The rotation had become a zero-sum game: Every time you added an offensive contributor, the defense suffered. Every time a stopper headed to the floor, the offense stagnated slightly. In the first round, we had only two players who could legitimately contribute on both ends: Tony Parker and Tim Duncan.
Given how cerebral Pop is, it’s possible he thought he could outmaneuver his team’s athletic limitations. But considering how pessimistic he sounded as the season drew to a close, I think he understood the truth of the matter quite clearly: No matter what coaching decisions he made, this collection of men was fatally flawed.
As the opening round vanishes in the distance, it’s easy to criticize Pop. On the surface, this season seems like one of his poorer performances. But, the more I consider the personnel available to him, I find it increasingly hard to point a finger. As the image of failure grew ever larger on the horizon, Pop’s decisions became increasingly restless and I sympathize with that. Contentment is a crown that seldom kings enjoy.
