The tried-and-true formula for San Antonio Spurs offseason acquisitions was predictable. You surround the three-headed silver and black monster of Tim Duncan, Manu Ginobili and Tony Parker with shooters and defenders.

For the longest time, it made sense and worked. Duncan would draw double-teams on the low block and pass the ball out to wide open shooters. Parker and Manu beat their defenders off the dribble and get into the lane. If they couldn’t find a shot for themselves, chances are there was a Spur around them somewhere who was open in shooting position. Then everybody did their damnedest to defend the right way on the other end of the floor.

But this summer may be the last we see of the typical model for bringing in new players. Duncan is aging quickly and draws fewer double-teams, it seems, by the month. Age isn’t catching up to Ginobili quite as fast, but Manu is still 33 years old and has an unfortunate history of injuries. Parker is squarely in his prime but will be a free agent at the end of the upcoming season, and the chances of him re-signing, or even remaining with the team that long, are uncertain to say the least. All that to say that there are big changes ahead for the Spurs over the next two seasons.

Because the Spurs can no longer count on their core for the long term, future free agent and draft pickups could change. James Anderson might be the last of the typical Spurs role players that are brought in. The last print before the mold is destroyed, if you will.

So what will they do then?

The transition from shopping for role players to searching for stars will begin. They can’t expect to land the number one overall pick in the draft and select a franchise cornerstone like Duncan and David Robinson. Again. Nor do the Spurs have international prospects stashed overseas with the potential for greatness like Ginobili and Parker.

Instead, the Spurs enter the NBA’s stock exchange, bringing in players based on potential. The front office gambling draft picks and cap space in hopes of bringing in a player who lives up to promise, defies expectations and shows the capability to perform at a level high enough to carry the franchise for several years. All while fitting in to the San Antonio Spurs culture and local community. Going four-for-four here is rare.

Bringing in players with star potential but little track record has its risks, ones the Spurs usually don’t take. George Hill was drafted with the promise of being a good NBA defender. But he also played three years of NCAA basketball before making the jump to the league. San Antonio drafted DeJuan Blair because he had lottery talent, but the front office knew rebounding ability usually translates well from college to the NBA. Ian Mahinmi? He doesn’t exist anymore.

While some may have the ceiling of a franchise player, others will simply bring abilities that the Spurs haven’t looked for recently. The front office won’t bring in exact replicas of Duncan, Parker and Ginobili, so instead, role players will have some skills that used to be sole property of the “big three.” The job description won’t simply be “shooter, defender.”

The one hesitation I have declaring the end of the way the Spurs front office built the roster is the decision to give four-year contracts to Richard Jefferson and Matt Bonner. Both were re-signed without much indication the direction the team will have in that time. It seems far-fetched to imagine Duncan, Ginobili and Parker all suiting up alongside Bonner and Jefferson in the silver and black in the 2013-2014 season.

The Spurs front office was the best in the business over the last decade when it came to keeping San Antonio a perennial championship contender. As this offseason ends and we look ahead to the next, (assuming there’s not a lockout) how the Spurs decide to add players to the roster will be just as interesting as anything else.

Brazil’s narrow 68-70 loss to Team USA offered a bit of nostalgia for Spurs fans tuning in to see their prized big man. There again were the beautiful offensive sets of Brazilian head coach Ruben Magnano (formerly of Argentina) running roughshod at times through the USA defense.

Splitter, however, is not Luis Scola. For one, he is already under contract with the Spurs.  And with the will-he-or-won’t-he-come speculation long since over, today’s game  finally removed some of the mystery surrounding the Brazilian big man.

At Splitter’s introductory press conference, Spurs general manager R.C. Buford mentioned that Tiago does not have his “NBA body” yet, but offered the following scouting report:

“I don’t think Tiago is going to be somebody we just throw the ball into the post until he gets a better understanding of our system,” Buford said. “But he’s a really good pick-and-roll player, very smart offensively and defensively, so they have to guard him.

After watching him operate against NBA talent, here are some my first thoughts on Tiago Splitter:

He should absolutely thrive in the San Antonio Spurs pick and roll system–For the game Splitter scored 13 points, going 6-12 from the field, getting most of his points through the pick and roll.

Splitter did not really set solid screens so much as he simply ran towards his teammate and slipped a pick before any contact was actually made (it will be interesting to see if this translates into offensive fouls in the NBA). Nor did he display the freakish athleticism (he was blocked twice at the rim) or sweet jumper usually associated with prime pick and roll players.

Where Tiago excelled was reading the defenses and finding seams. Combining good mobility with a high basketball IQ, it’s easy to see the Spurs utilizing Splitter in the same role Fabricio Oberto played. At worst, watching him and Manu Ginobili operate the pick and roll next season should be a joy.

The foundation for a post game is there, even if the foundation isn’t–The scouting report on Splitter is that he is a back to the basket player with excellent footwork. The fear is how it translates to the stronger (though less physical) NBA game.

While Splitter did display solid footwork, creating some space and holding his pivot under duress, there are questions about his lower body strength. He appeared to have trouble holding his position against Lamar Odom, losing his balance on his first few post attempts.

As Buford stated, he needs to work on his “NBA body”, but until then Splitter might be able to utilize his post game by using screens to get position under the basket or working on the move.

The motion factor–Keeping with the Oberto comparison, Splitter might be Duncan’s first partner since the Argentine to catch, pass, and make quick decisions on the move. As mentioned above, Splitter seems adept at reading defenses, something that is very helpful in the motion offense.

Brazil was confident enough in Splitter’s decision making to use him to break Team USA’s full court pressure, running their center down the middle of the floor as the first outlet. With one exception in which he dribbled the ball up court himself, Splitter generally made quick and correct decisions in these scenarios.

In another sequence, Splitter was confronted with a defender just as he caught the ball while rolling to the hoop. Realizing where the help was coming from, Splitter made a quick pass to the corner for an open 3-pointer. This is a concept many big men struggle with and one that is vital in the Spurs system.

Defense, defense, defense–In many ways Team USA was a perfect opponent to gauge how Splitter fits the Spurs defensive needs. Not a shot blocker (though he did have a nice one on Westbrook to end the first quarter), Splitter uses quick feet and length to disrupt pick and rolls.

While he might not be athletic in NBA terms, he is very mobile and he uses it to great effect. While guarding quicker, face up fours, Splitter was able to show on the screens enough to disrupt the ball handler and still recover to the rim. Watching Splitter guard both ball handler and man was, at times, very Duncan-like.

It will be interesting to see how Splitter fits in alongside Tim Duncan. From the little bit I saw, he should be enough to help the Spurs to take a step up this season but probably not enough to make a difference should any of the big three show further decline.

Hairston’s 2009-10 season with the Spurs ended prematurely because of an ankle injury. He was also absent from the Spurs summer league team, and it was believed that it was in part because of the same ankle injury. Who knows if the Spurs had some knowledge of this back injury.

If Hairston’s Italian career is short-lived, it’s difficult to say what interest he or the Spurs would have in a reunion.

(HT: Nicola Mezzadri)

This is how I felt about the San Antonio Spurs’ last season. During training camp 2009, Gregg Popovich vowed a return to defensive form, wanting his team to get back to the top of the NBA’s defensive rankings. But the Spurs never got there. The Spurs weren’t plus-sized; they weren’t even fat-faced.  The promise of a defensive return to form fell flat from Day 1.

Now, of course, Gregg Popovich is not Karl Lagerfeld. There is no doubt that Popovich preached defense as ardently and sincerely as ever before–his intentions were true. The Spurs’ defensive failures were not bound up in a disingenuous promise. The Spurs failed because they didn’t have the right personnel to meet Popovich’s defensive demands. And this was true across the roster–it wasn’t simply a problem of Richard Jefferson’s inability to recreate Bruce Bowen.

The Spurs’ signing of Tiago Splitter will help their front court. Splitter’s ability to defend the pick and roll is well-documented.  But what else have the Spurs done to upgrade their defensive personnel?

This is me pleading ignorance, not protesting the team’s offseason. Neither James Anderson nor Gary Neal nor Matt Bonner nor Richard Jefferson nor Alonzo Gee are defensive specialists, at least they’re not billed that way. Tim Duncan is a year older. DeJuan Blair is still short. Tony Parker and Manu Ginobili give great effort, but are, generally put, offensive players. Garrett Temple was a good defender in limited minutes last season, and he is the one “new” face on the perimeter whose defensive abilities put a little pollyanna in this blogger.

In addition to the absence of capable defensive personnel, the Spurs lacked quality perimeter shooters last season. The front office seems to have addressed the issue of shooting this offseason, but left their die hard faithful with questions about their the team’s overall defensive ability. So, in short, the big question facing the Spurs this season is whether Popovich can make good on his ambition to return the Spurs to the top of the league’s defensive rankings, a year later than he had originally planned. And if so, who will emerge as San Antonio’s go-to defensive specialist(s)?

Sebastian Pruiti is at it again. Today over at NBA Playbook, Pruiti looks at how NBA teams take advantage on the offensive end when double-teamed.

And wouldn’t'cha know it, the San Antonio Spurs are one team that he thinks does a great job beating double teams.

Handling double teams is really a team effort.  Not only does the man getting double teamed need to be able to make a good pass under duress, but his teammates need to provide him with a passing lane.  In my opinion, the two teams that handle double teams very well are the San Antonio Spurs and the Orlando Magic.  Both teams have very good big men (in Tim Duncan and Dwight Howard), so they see (and beat) plenty of double teams.  Despite both teams being very successful, the Spurs and the Magic handle double teams in very different ways:

….

Whenever Tim Duncan gets double teamed, the Spurs like to send a cutter diving through the lane.  In theory, it makes sense, because when a double team takes place, most teams are worried about rotating on the perimeter, so when a cut happens, it is hard to adjust to.  They are able to be successful with this because they have a big man who is willing to let the double team come and make a pass over it.  Also important is his teammate’s ability to time their cuts just right.

It’s yet another great post from Bassy this summer. The only thing Pruiti doesn’t mention, that I’ll add, is that patience is key. One of the main reasons the Spurs are so adept at beating doubles is because of Tim Duncan’s patience. Duncan allows himself to be double-teamed and occupies both defenders long enough to allow his teammates to get open and in passing lanes.

It’s an underrated skill of Duncan’s and something that players with lesser poise are unable to replicate.

On Wednesday, Kelly Dwyer of the Yahoo! Ball Don’t Lie blog posted his list of the Top 30 power forwards in the NBA. The pride and joy of St. Croix, Tim Duncan, finished second on the list.

Who was number one? If you couldn’t tell by the photo and headline (I hope you readers are more perceptive than that), it’s Pau Gasol.

At first glance, the claim in scandalous. Pau Gasol, that skinny Spaniard who couldn’t win a playoff game in Memphis? He’s a better power forward right now than the greatest power forward of all-time?

Dwyer explains his choice of Pau Gasol:

Big men don’t get more versatile than this guy. He’s bad at absolutely nothing, and top gear in just about everything. Scores with either hand on either block. Dominates from the high post. Nails cutters, sets screens and finishes off the good or bad pass. He can play defense now, he’s worked his way into becoming a fierce rebounder and his brain is bigger than our brains are.

Even with Tim Duncan’s history, his smarts, his ability and his formidable all-around play, there isn’t a power forward in this league that I think can help me win more than Pau Gasol. He just does things too excellently too often to overlook.

I won’t argue one bit with KD’s assessment of Gasol’s skills. There are few players at any position who are as skilled as the Lakers’ big man. Where Pau has faced criticism in the past is the part of the game where Duncan excels, the mental aspect. Critics labeled Gasol as soft in the past and knocked his inability to win as “the man.”

Duncan, on the other hand, has been Teflon when it comes to similar accusations. The most adversity he’s faced on that front was in the 2005 NBA Finals against the Detroit Pistons, when the media accused the Spurs big man of choking because he missed six free throws late in Game 5 and the game-winning tip-in. (Side rant: Was this really a story, or did PTI just need to fill two minutes of airtime that June? I know a lot of people found that series boring, but damn.)

Some folks might look to accuse Pau Gasol of being the number two option on the Lakers behind Kobe Bryant, claiming he can’t be the best power forward in the league if he’s not the best player on his team. For that, I have two responses. First, watch the Finals again and tell me who the best player was. Second, the same argument could be said about Tim Duncan. When the Spurs were turning it around last year and peaking in March and April, who was the best player on the team?

KD doesn’t get into the numbers when separating the top two in his list, so that’s exactly what I’ll do. Here’s a look at both players’ season averages:

So according to the box score, Gasol has the slight edge. But let’s dig a little deeper. According to Synergy Sports, Pau Gasol had 1550 possessions last season that ended in with Gasol getting fouled, or a shot or turnover from him. Of those 1550 possessions, Gasol scored 1.04 points per possession. On the flip side, Duncan had 1563 possessions of the same sort and scored 1 PPP.

In the post, Gasol ended 621 possessions and scored .99 PPP on 48% shooting from the field. Duncan scored 1 PPP and shot 49.5% in 669 tries. How about spotting up outside the lane? Gasol scored 41.3% of the time in 126 possessions. His counter, Duncan, had a 41.2% scoring percentage in 114 possessions.

Defensively, the numbers are just as tight. Overall, Gasol allowed .88 PPP in 792 possessions where he defended the player who took the shot, was fouled or turned the ball over. Tim Duncan conceded .86 PPP in 648 opportunities.

When isolated against, Gasol was scored on 41.6% of the time. Duncan? 41.7%.

Post defense was the one major area where there was a significant advantage one way or the other. Pau Gasol gave up .92 PPP when defending the post. Duncan on the other hand allowed just .79 PPP.

Upon first impression, you don’t think the two players are that similar. But when you look close, it’s tough to call. Gasol’s box score is slightly better while Duncan may have the edge in specific situations.

But in the end, it doesn’t matter. What it all comes down to is this: Pau Gasol has been in the last three NBA Finals series, and won the last two. So yeah, Gasol is the better power forward right now. And I’m sure Tim Duncan would be the first to tell you the same.

According to Mike Monroe of the San Antonio Express-News, Danny Ferry is about to return to the San Antonio Spurs front office.

Ferry, who resigned as general manager of the Cleveland Cavaliers ahead of LeBron James’ free agency defection in July, officially will be announced as a member of the Spurs’ front office by week’s end.

A source familiar with the team’s discussions with Ferry confirmed a YahooSports report that Ferry soon will re-unite with the team.

A member of the Spurs’ 2003 NBA title team, Ferry will replace Dell Demps, the club’s director of pro player personnel.

This likely puts Ferry in the clean-up spot of the Spurs front office, behind RC Buford, Gregg Popovich and assistant general manager Dennis Lindsey. It could be considered a significant step back for Ferry, who was the Cavs GM for five seasons and in the running for the Portland Trail Blazers vacant GM spot after his resignation in Cleveland. One has to wonder if Ferry looks at returning San Antonio as a temporary stepping stone to another GM position in a season or two.

Danny Ferry will also take over operations of the Austin Toros from Demps. His first order of business will likely be to find a replacement for Quin Snyder, who left his position as the Toros head coach this summer to join Doug Collins’ staff for the Philadelphia 76ers.

The Spurs can only hope that Ferry is able to help replicate the success of Demps when it comes to player development. Though it’s impossible to know how much Demps actually influenced player development in his time, the progress of young players like George Hill, DeJuan Blair, Malik Hairston and Ian Mahinmi speaks volumes to the growth done at both the NBA and D-League level.

Chances are, if you’re a regular reader of this blog you have a pretty good idea of what the San Antonio Spurs like to do, and avoid, on the defensive end of the floor.

But from time-to-time, I find it helpful to review things to keep them fresh in my head. And seeing as it’s mid-August and the NBA is on vacation, I thought we’d take a look at a couple of the bedrock principles of the Spurs’ defense.

Force guards away from the middle of the floor

It’s easy to boil it down to this: when the ball-handler gets to the middle and into the lane, bad things happen. This is because the offensive player has options. And the basic premises of defense are to limit the number of ways the offense can score and make it as hard as possible for them to do that.

When opposing guards get into the lane, they cause damage. They get good looks at the basket, find open teammates and draw fouls. A ball-handler in the middle of the lane usually has a better look at the basket than when forced towards the sideline or baseline. Additionally, he probably got past the defender guarding him en route to the lane. This means other defenders will have to rotate over to help on the ball-handler, leaving other offensive players open if the ball-handler can find them with a good pass.

In the play diagrammed below, Steve Nash got to the lane against the Spurs defense late in Game 2 of the teams’ Western Conference Semifinal series. The Suns had a eight point lead with about a minute left in the game. It’s a pretty significant advantage that late in the game, but not insurmountable. On the play, Nash used a pick at the top of the 3-point arc from Amar’e Stoudemire to get by George Hill and into the lane.

When Nash got into the lane, he had Hill on his right hip and a decent look at the basket. Almost every Spur on the floor had at least one foot in the lane and none were farther than two feet away.

Nash kicked the ball out to Jason Richardson, who blew past Manu Ginobili. Manu was a step outside the lane helping on Nash’s penetration and tried to closeout on Richardson, but Richardson got by him and hit the jumper at the elbow to finish off the game.

But it wasn’t all bad defensively against the Suns. Earlier in that same game, George Hill had a great defensive possession against Nash. The Suns point guard dribbled to the left wing and looked to get the ball in the post to Stoudemire, who was fronted by DeJuan Blair. Blair did a good job fronting Stoudemire, as he’s learned to do, and Nash was unable to get the ball in the post.

After determining he couldn’t get an entry pass into Stoudemire, Nash gave George Hill a quick shoulder fake toward the middle and went baseline. Hill stayed with Nash the whole time and rode him toward the baseline without needing help defense to come and stop the ball. Nash tried to find a teammate but stepped on the baseline before he got a pass off and turned the ball over.

Notice in the video of the play, Hill’s footwork. His body is angled with his back to the middle to encourage Nash to go baseline.

Do not give up the corner 3-pointer, otherwise you face the wrath of Coach Pop

Spurs head coach Gregg Popovich’s next hard-and-fast rule on defense is to prevent the opponent from getting a corner 3. Coach Pop believes that the corner 3 is one of the most effective shots in basketball, which is why the Spurs look for so many corner 3′s on offense and try to prevent all of them on defense.

Luckily for Spurs fans, but not so much for me, it’s hard to find a video clip of San Antonio rotating improperly and allowing an open corner 3. However, Eddy Rivera from Magic Basketball had a great post this week about the 2/5 (or shooting guard and center) pick and roll play that Orlando uses. In that post, he had a video where the Atlanta Hawks make a rotation that would make Coach Pop’s blood boil.

Vince Carter brought the ball up-court for Orlando and Marcin Gortat came up to set a pick on Marvin Williams, who’s guarding Carter. Carter rubbed off the pick and attacked the basket. From the corner, Joe Johnson of the Hawks rotated over to stop Carter’s progress to the basket.

In doing so, Johnson left Mickael Pietrus, a 38% 3-point shooter last season, open in the corner. Carter takes the shot himself – because he’s Vince Carter – and makes it, but Pietrus would’ve been a good option.

Had the Spurs been the defensive team on this play, there would’ve been an immediate timeout called and, chances are, the guy who left Pietrus open wouldn’t have emerged from the huddle. You may remember last year a situation in which when San Antonio played the Detroit Pistons, Tony Parker allowed a 3-pointer from Rodney Stuckey and a spat between Parker and Coach Pop occurred. Parker was taken out of the game as a punishment.

Instead, the way the Spurs defend that play is to rotate help defenenders from the other side of the floor. Johnson would stay on Pietrus, denying the pass to him, and Jamal Crawford, guarding Jameer Nelson in the opposite corner, would’ve rotated over to stop the ball. Because Nelson in the corner is still a decent pass for Carter to make, Josh Smith, guarding Rashard Lewis near the top of the key, would’ve slid down to prevent a pass to Nelson in the corner.

Lewis, a good 3-point shooter, is open near the top of the key, but for Carter to make that pass he would have to stop and turn. That would enable any defender, whether it’s Josh Smith or someone else, time to recover and prevent Lewis from getting a good shot.

The video below, from Game 1 of the Spurs-Suns series, shows San Antonio denying a corner 3 opportunity. Steve Nash beats Tony Parker off the dribble and Richard Jefferson, defending Grant Hill in the corner, doesn’t flinch. As Nash drives in his direction, Jefferson inches closer to Hill. Instead, you can see the help defense come from Tim Duncan and Manu Ginobili. Antonio McDyess fulfills his duty to cover Ginobili’s man in the opposite corner. Nash ends up dribbling the ball out of bounds.

Play Diagrams in this post were created in FastDraw. To learn more about FastDraw and to purchase it today visit their website at www.fastmodeltechnologies.com.

It’s widely known that traditionally, San Antonio Spurs players over the years have been good defensive players. But how good are they really?

We’re talking greatest-of-all-time good.

Neil Paine of Basketball-Reference.com posted a list of the top 100 players based on their team defenses. Confused? Here’s Neil’s criteria:

1. Estimate defensive efficiency (points allowed per 100 possessions) for every team since 1951 in the regular-season and playoffs.
2. Adjust playoff defensive ratings up/down based on regular-season offensive strength of postseason foes.
3. Compare defensive efficiencies to the league average (to account for the fact that the avg. was, for instance, 85 pts/100 poss in 1951 and 108 in 2010)
4. Find career averages (weighted by MP with each team) for every player since the NBA started tracking minutes in 1952.

After crunching the numbers, four San Antonio Spurs land in the top 10 on the list, and eight are in the top 20. The top Spur was Manu Ginobili, who was number six on the list with a team defense rating of -5.72 (which is good). Topping the list overall was K.C. Jones with a team defense rating of -6.74.

The other Spurs in the top 10 were Tim Duncan at number seven (-5.60), Tony Parker at number eight (-5.48) and Bruce Bowen at 10 (-4.96).

Following the list, Neil has this paragraph that should warm the hearts of many Spurs fans through the winter:

On Friday, we saw that being a part of the Steve Nash-era Suns or the Showtime Lakers of the 80s went a long way toward securing a place on the “played for the best offenses” list… Well, today it becomes clear that playing for the Bill Russell/Red Auerbach Celtics and the Tim Duncan/Gregg Popovich Spurs is the key to appearing on the “best defenses” ranking. Each of the top 5 players on this list were a part of the Celtics’ first dynasty, and 5 of the next 6 players on the list belonged to the Spurs of recent vintage (the one who didn’t? Frank Ramsey … of the 50s/60s Celts).

And if all that wasn’t enough, there’s this. Kobe Bryant and Shaquille O’Neal don’t appear on the list until numbers 83 (-2.39) and 94 (-2.22), respectively.

There’s not a lot going on regarding the NBA right now. That’s not fun. But luckily for us, this is one of those summers where international basketball is in the spotlight. The FIBA World Championships kick-off on Saturday morning in Turkey and a couple of players property of the San Antonio Spurs will take stage.

In this episode of the 4-Down Podcast, Os Davis from BallinEurope.com joins me to talk about international basketball. We cover both of the Spurs’ interests in the tournament, Tiago Splitter of Brazil and Nando De Colo of France, and the tournament itself.

I was curious why the FIBA World Championships don’t get the same amount of hype in America as the Olympics do, even though the Worlds are the basketball equivalent of the World Cup in soccer.

Os also gives podcast listeners a heads up on a handful of players to watch out for in the tournament and one international player to remember come next June’s NBA Draft.

Make sure to subscribe to the 4-Down Podcast via RSS feed or iTunes. And tell your friends, because you love us.

There are rules and guidelines by which each is identified, but whether on the court or in a set, the improvisational character of each always gives rise to moments that challenge our preconceived notions.

I’ve long opposed the concept of roles defined by positional fundamentalism, which might be defined as a dogmatic reliance on traditional position labels such as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.  Positional fundamentalism, with it’s outdated and glib outlook,  robs basketball of its fluidity, of its jazz-like beauty. Recently, Drew Cannon of Basketball Prospectus and Rob Mahoney of the Two Man Game have taken up the task of accounting for the jazz. In other words,  they’re rethinking how we define positions. (Something Mahoney admits is an ever evolving process.)

There is no end to this process. Even if we successfully shed the five traditional positions in favor of some other system, players and their roles will continue to evolve. It’s critical that we’re constantly challenging the limits of positionality to match with the on-court product. Note that those limits aren’t being tested without reason. It’s important that positional rhetoric remains descriptivist in nature. We’re no saying this is the way that position X should play,” but rather “this is the way that position X does play.”

There is certainly some intrigue to the system. But as Mahoney states, it needs to be further developed and refined.

Exploring Defense and the death of D1

Offensively, classifying players as distributors, scorers, shooters, etc. is simple enough because we have any number of statistics and visual evidence to verify their individual talents. Defense, however, is much harder to define.

In the proposed positional model, players offensive roles are defined by what their individual skills are while their defensive roles are still chained to a positional base, categorizing defenders from D1-D5 (with each number related to the position or height/speed set a player can defend–Ex. Jason Kidd being a Distributor/D2).

Part of the problem is tying a defensive players role or worth entirely to their work on a single offensive player because it assumes every position or player can be guarded by an individual.

For one, the concept of a D1–a defender capable of guarding point guards–is a myth in today’s NBA. It is impossible to guard a quality point guard with another point guard.

NBA point guards, or at least the players who fit the size and athletic attributes of a point guard, are generally the quickest, shiftiest players on the court. Combine that with the skill of quality NBA point guards and the abolishment of all physical contact on the perimeter and defending the position is impossible.

The only counter in a man-to-man scheme against such talents, without sending a large amount of help, is to put a long, athletic defender on a point guard. One who, like Trevor Ariza or Bruce Bowen, can back off enough to buy some reaction time while still having enough reach to contest a shot without being right on top of the offensive player.

In this regard, most of the point guards in the NBA cannot truly be classified as being a D1. And since point guards are generally too small to guard other positions, does that mean they have no role defensively?

Identifying Defensive Roles

Offense, simplified, is putting the ball in the basket. As basketball fans, we’ve cataloged a number of different roles players assume to that end–and the positional revolution stems in great deal to the acceptance that these roles do not need to come from specific positions, so long as they are present–but realistically scoring can come through individual effort.

Defense, simplified, is preventing the offense from scoring. There are two positive outcomes a defense can hope for to that end: a turnover, or forcing the team into a missed shot. But the roles players play in preventing scoring are still largely attributed by position.

But just as there are multiple roles for offense, there are multiple roles players take in accomplishing a team’s goals on defense, namely disrupt, deny, and contain.

Disrupt

With no risk there is little reward. Because defense revolves around what an offense wishes to accomplish, it is largely a reactionary process. As mentioned before, it is almost impossible for point guards to defend their position. But that does not mean they have no role.

Players like Chris Paul or Rajon Rondo thrive in the passing lanes and create havoc by forcing the action. They can disrupt an entire offense for stretches in this manner, but it does not mean that they are individually shutting down their man.

Disruptors break conventional defensive systems and take a more proactive stance in defense, creating turnovers and hesitation in offensive players at the expense of opening up opportunities for an offense to exploit.

Applied to traditional positional roles, point guards pressure the ball handler and play passing lanes, wings search those same lanes while trying to swipe steals in help opportunities, and big men hunt for blocks.

Deny

Some offensive players are so potent with the ball in their hands that they are impossible to defend. At which point the best option becomes to make them work as hard as possible to get the ball in the first place.

While disruptors generally possess quick strike athleticism, deny defense can be played with endurance, determination, and a certain amount of strength as the required attributes.

Against the Boston Celtics, J.J. Redick carved out  niche defensively not because he possesses exceptional physical attributes, but because he became particularly adept at chasing his man through screens and denying them the ball in their comfort zones.

Now, once the ball got into the offensive player’s hands in open space the tides may have turned, but the act of making the offense work so hard to get the ball into their first or second options is enough to gain an advantage.

Contain

The most thankless role in the entire NBA, and  the hardest to quantify. There is no glory in simply staying in front of your man and forcing them into difficult shots, because even against the most undisciplined defense a quality offensive player is going to score.

Contain means simply that. Those that subscribe to this methodology of defense work to remove options from his matchup and work hard to gain a favorable shot.

Bruce Bowen was the epitome of this. Shane Battier too. These are the system players that work within their coach’s rules, pushing their matchup into help defenders, moving their feet, and refusing to fall for feints.

Meaningful Application

Even with defensive roles assigned we must concede that the way in which they are carried out are still tied to the physical attributes assigned to traditional positional assignments.

So my proposition is to remove the D from D1-D5, and simply assign numbers based on the range players have comparable functional athleticism for (with a slight tilt to allow for defensive matchups they can handle) with their most comfortable range in parenthises. Then listing their defensive roles.

So a breakdown of the Spurs roster would look like this:

James Anderson (2) 2-3, Scorer, ???
DeJuan Blair (5) 4-5, Rebounder, Contain
Matt Bonner (4) 4-5, Shooter, Contain
Tim Duncan (5) 4-5, Scorer/Creator/Rebounder, Contain
Manu Ginobili (2) 1-3,  Scorer/Handler/Creator, Disrupt
George Hill (2) 1-3, Scorer, Deny/Contain
Richard Jefferson (3) 3, Scorer, Contain
Antonio McDyess (4) 4-5, Rebounder, Contain
Tony Parker (1) 1, Scorer/Handler/Creator, Contain
Tiago Splitter (5) 4-5, Scorer/???, Contain/???
Garrett Temple (1) 1-3, Creator, Disrupt/Contain

It’s no surprise that Richard Jefferson faces a lot of pressure in his second season on the San Antonio Spurs. In his first, Jefferson came with the weight of a $15 million salary. And while averages of 12.3 points and 4.4 rebounds per game were decent, they did not fulfill the expectations many fans and team personnel had. Even though he’ll be playing at a reduced price in 2010-11, the belief that he should play at a level worthy of a $15 million contract will still be there.

Earlier this summer, our amigo Sebastian Pruiti of Nets Are Scorching and NBA Playbook took a pretty good look at what Richard Jefferson did, and didn’t do, well last year. According to Synergy Sports, in the Spurs’ half court offense Jefferson was most effective scoring the ball off of cuts. He was sixth in the NBA last year with 1.61 points per possession when shooting off of a cut. Unfortunately for Jefferson and the Spurs, RJ only shot off a slash 8% of the time. RJ spent far more time spotting up (33.9%) and missing (just .91 points per possession).

A very large portion of the plays Jefferson scored off a cut were because of penetrate-and-kick plays, double teams on teammates, offensive rebounds and broken plays. But San Antonio had two set plays that they ran in order to free him in the half court and get him on the move.

The first play San Antonio used was an alley-oop play. In the following charts, powered by FastDraw technology, you can see the progression of the play and how the Spurs were able to free Jefferson for the dunk.

In this first diagram, the point guard brings the ball to the opposite side of the floor that RJ sets up at. The center, who usually in-bounds the ball on the other end of the floor and trails the play, switches places with the power forward, who comes up and sets a pick for the point guard. The point guard rubs off the pick and dribbles away from Jefferson’s side of the floor.

After coming off the pick, the point guard passes the ball to the shooting guard on the wing, and then the point guard cuts under the basket and goes all the way to the opposite sideline. The power forward rolls to the opposite block after setting the pick for the point guard, and the center curls from the opposite block to set a screen for the shooting guard who just received the pass. Jefferson slowly moves up near the top of the 3-point line.

The shooting guard dribbles off the pick set by the center and comes up to the top of the key. Here, he passes the ball to Jefferson.

After passing the ball to Jefferson, the 2-guard ventures back to where he came from and the center rolls slowly back to the block. RJ swings the ball to the wing where the point guard set up.

After swinging the ball to the point guard, Richard Jefferson follows the ball and acts like he’s going to set a pick for the point. It’s a believable move, because Spurs players often set immediate picks for the ball handler right after making the pass.

But on this play, RJ fakes setting the pick and curls around a back screen from the power forward. If the player guarding the power forward isn’t paying attention and the guy guarding the center hasn’t returned to help position, there’s an open lane to the basket for a finish at the rim.

Now here’s the play with real people acting it out:

Gotta love that Amare Stoudemire help defense.

The next play is one the Spurs used a couple variations of during the year. Its basic purpose is to free Richard Jefferson as he cuts to the basket, similar to the previous play, but it’s not designed to lead to an alley-oop.

RJ sets up on one wing with the shooting guard occupying the other. The power forward sets up on the block nearest to Jefferson. The point guard brings the ball up the floor on the side closer to Richard Jefferson and swings the ball to trailing big man on the opposite side.

The center who just received the pass swings it around the 3-point line to the shooting guard. As this goes on, the power forward on the block turns and sets a screen for Richard Jefferson.

RJ has two options here. He can go baseline on the screen or go on top of the screen. Going over the screen usually gets him a better look at the basket when he receives the pass, but the defender is usually cheating that way and trying to prevent him that route. Either way he chooses, Jefferson will usually fake one way and go the other. If he’s open, he receives a pass from the shooting guard at or near the rim.

One variation the Spurs executed on this play is having the power forward set the screen higher up the lane. This usually affords Jefferson a little more space to work with when he gets the ball. Instead of immediately going up for the shot, like he would do when he caught it near the basket, Jefferson could catch the ball in the middle of the lane and take a jump shot, throw an up-fake, or curl off the screen and go toward the basket.

In the following play, which came in San Antonio’s first round series against the Dallas Mavericks, the Spurs run a variation of this play. In this instance, instead of the point guard passing the ball to the trailing center and the center swinging it to the two-guard, the center set a down-screen for Manu Ginobili, playing shooting guard, and Ginobili received the ball from the point guard at the top of the 3-point arc. Manu then hit Richard Jefferson with a pass at the rim after Jefferson came off of the Tim Duncan screen. Jefferson sees Dallas’ Caron Butler cheating over the Duncan screen, so RJ goes baseline and beats the Mavs forward for a layup.

Last season, the Spurs played Dallas four times in the regular season and six times in the playoffs. Adding little wrinkles to set plays, like changing where the pass comes from, is important to keep plays effective. The Mavericks saw this play several times in person last year and even more on film. But changing the angle gives the defense a different look than they’re expecting.

And now Christian Laettner is in the Hall of Fame, which is weird.

Empires fall. The history books are littered with them. The Greeks. The Romans. Spain. Britain. Maybe someday even America. The same holds true for nearly every major power that’s ever risen to the top, be it nation, corporation, or basketball team.

Especially basketball teams. After all, unlike nations or corporations, basketball teams rely solely on physical assets (players) whose value depreciates relatively quickly. But does it have to be this way? If given the proper warning signs can a team stave off decline?

A year ago author Jim Collins of  How the Mighty Fall talked to Business Week explaining the five stages of decline. It’s an interesting read and one that is not only applicable to business. In it, he poses an interesting question:

“When you are at the top of the world, the most powerful nation on Earth, the most successful company in your industry, the best player in your game, your very power and success might cover up the fact that you’re already on the path of decline.” That question—how would you know?

The premise of the book is simple–if you can identify signs of decline AND react accordingly, you can reverse the course of decline if not avoid it all together. The San Antonio Spurs have sat near or at the top of the NBA hierarchy for two decades.

Have the Spurs begun their own descent? Apparently. They’ve gone from perennial title favorite to merely just another good team. But with the latest offseason additions they are also far from fallen. And if you are to believe what’s written in the linked excerpt, the notion of the Spurs continuing their run with Gregg Popovich and R.C. Buford at the helm is not so far fetched.

Stage 1: Hubris Born of Success

Great enterprises can become insulated by success; accumulated momentum can carry an enterprise forward for a while, even if its leaders make poor decisions or lose discipline. Stage 1 kicks in when people become arrogant, regarding success virtually as an entitlement, and they lose sight of the true underlying factors that created success in the first place.

When the rhetoric of success (“We’re successful because we do these specific things”) replaces penetrating understanding and insight (“We’re successful because we understand why we do these specific things and under what conditions they would no longer work”), decline will very likely follow.

In my opinion, herein lies the greatest strength of the San Antonio Spurs enduring run. The common link between each member of the Spurs–and they’ve ranged from choir boys (Avery Johnson, David Robinson) to auto-tune hero to Stephen Jackson–is that they have, as Gregg Popovich puts it, “gotten over themselves”.

The book identifies one trait commonly found amongst all great leaders:

The best leaders we’ve studied never presume they’ve reached ultimate understanding of all the factors that brought them success. For one thing, they retain a somewhat irrational fear that perhaps their success stems in large part from fortuitous circumstance.

Popovich often jokes that when Tim Duncan retires, he will join him shortly out the door. Much of his success, Popovich quickly attributes to the lucky bounce of a few ping pong balls, which is the sort of attitude one would expect from a man who once lived in the dorms of Division III Pomona-Pitzer before rising up the NBA ranks.

Luck and chance are essential to any bit of success. Those who understand this, that retain that irrational fear, often drive themselves to be better positioned when that luck runs out.

Perhaps the best example of a team succumbing to stage 1 is the Shaq led Los Angeles Lakers. As great a dynasty as they were, there was the lack of condition on Shaq’s part. The massive egos tearing the team apart. And ultimately a team that lost sight of what carried them to success in the 2004 NBA Finals against a hungry Detroit Pistons team.

Popovich and Tim Duncan have created an identity in San Antonio. They understand why what they do is successful (jump shots come and go, but defense is a product of effort and as such can always be consistent), and under what circumstances they no longer work.

It can be argued that the Spurs have moved slightly away from this identity, but if they have, it was not due to hubris.

Stage 2: Undisciplined Pursuit of More

Hubris from Stage 1 (“We’re so great, we can do anything!”) leads right to Stage 2, the Undisciplined Pursuit of More—more scale, more growth, more acclaim, more of whatever those in power see as “success.” Companies in Stage 2 stray from the disciplined creativity that led them to greatness in the first place, making undisciplined leaps into areas where they cannot be great or growing faster than they can achieve with excellence—or both.

Chris Paul wants out of New Orleans, and unless something drastic happens the Hornets will eventually find what could have been victimized by their own undisciplined pursuit of more. The New Orleans Hornets were never great, but they could have been.

Enticed by the promise of their young franchise point guard and a playoff appearance, the Hornets signed a slew of bad long-term contract for aging players in a market that could afford neither. Rather than putting a young team with cheap assets (i.e., draft picks) to grow around Chris Paul like the Oklahoma City Thunder have done with Kevin Durant, the Hornets reached a one-year peak and fizzled.

Chance has led to the Spurs success in this regard, but Popovich and Buford have done a masterful job of capitalizing on it. Pairing a rookie Tim Duncan with David Robinson put the Spurs immediately in the hunt as title contenders, meaning patience was a nice but unnecessary virtue.

Still, the team has done little to move beyond their means, always maintaining flexibility to upgrade around their core despite comparatively limited monetary resources. The patience to wait on developing foreign draft picks has landed them Manu Ginobili and Tiago Splitter.

And while the Spurs could have traded away any number of their assets to try and push them into championship contention for a one-year shot, their faith in the system and their young players has quietly left them with a promising young nucleus of George Hill, DeJuan Blair, Tiago Splitter, and James Anderson moving past the Tim Duncan Era.

Stage 3: Denial of Risk and Peril

As companies move into Stage 3, internal warning signs begin to mount, yet external results remain strong enough to “explain away” disturbing data or to suggest that the difficulties are “temporary” or “cyclic” or “not that bad,” and “nothing is fundamentally wrong.” In Stage 3, leaders discount negative data, amplify positive data, and put a positive spin on ambiguous data.

Those in power start to blame external factors for setbacks rather than accept responsibility. The vigorous, fact-based dialogue that characterizes high-performance teams dwindles or disappears altogether. When those in power begin to imperil the enterprise by taking outsize risks and acting in a way that denies the consequences of those risks, they are headed straight for Stage 4.

The next two stages present an interesting case study between three NBA teams: the San Antonio Spurs, the Phoenix Suns, and the Cleveland Cavaliers. It is between stages three and four that visible signs of decline first begin to manifest themselves.

The Spurs have continued on their steady pace while the Suns and Cavaliers have each dealt with stage four in different ways with one holding off Stage 5 (at least temporarily) by returning to their roots and the other charging full force into ruin.

The book offers a risk-taking concept it calls the “waterline principle”:

Think of being on a ship, and imagine that any decision gone bad will blow a hole in the side of the ship. If you blow a hole above the waterline (where the ship won’t take on water and possibly sink), you can patch the hole, learn from the experience, and sail on. But if you blow a hole below the waterline, you can find yourself facing gushers of water pouring in, pulling you toward the ocean floor. And if it’s a big enough hole, you might go down really fast, just like some of the financial firm catastrophes of 2008.

Successful powers take big risks, but never those that put holes below the waterline.

For the Suns, the waterline risks presented themselves in two ways: unwavering belief in a system to the point that the powers that be deemed it unnecessary to tweak, and the belief that the team could leverage all of its draft picks for financial gain and still succeed.

In Phoenix, the Suns playoff failures can be defined by Mike D’Antoni’s press conferences: “Our defense/system/effort was fine, we just need to push the ball more”, and pinning losses on external factors, injuries, suspensions, etc.

In short, the Suns management believed so much in its system that any failures had to be someone else’s fault and not the fact that the team had no depth because it sold off all of its draft picks, which helped contribute to injuries because the extended minutes a short rotation had to play, and the failure to take responsibility for their player’s own actions (coming off the bench).

In Cleveland, regular season success and the growth of LeBron James led Danny Ferry to continuously build on to the team in the belief that the Cavaliers were merely one piece away without considering the possibility that their might be a fundamental flaw to their system, core, or even their superstar.

In Stage 3, success had led to the demise of self evaluation and in turn has led to risks without consideration of consequences–mostly because of the organizations own self delusions of where they stand.

In San Antonio, the Spurs experience their share of peaks and valleys, but the team always gives an honest evaluation of itself and acts accordingly. Popovich refuses to allow the team to blame external factors, always keeping focus on what it can control.

The team identifies and attempts to correct fundamental weaknesses, sometimes taking risks, but never at the expense of punching a hole below the waterline. Even in the Richard Jefferson trade, the team a.) gave up little to acquire him, and b.) gave themselves an out (his opt-out that resulted in a reasonable deal when you consider what they gave Splitter).

Stage 4: Grasping for Salvation

The cumulative peril and/or risks gone bad of Stage 3 assert themselves, throwing the enterprise into a sharp decline visible to all. The critical question is: How does its leadership respond? By lurching for a quick salvation or by getting back to the disciplines that brought about greatness in the first place? Those who grasp for salvation have fallen into Stage 4.

Common “saviors” include a charismatic visionary leader, a bold but untested strategy, a radical transformation, a dramatic cultural revolution, a hoped-for blockbuster product, a “game-changing” acquisition, or any number of other silver-bullet solutions. Initial results from taking dramatic action may appear positive, but they do not last.

The obvious example of Stage 4 is the Phoenix Suns, who experienced new leaders (Terry Porter/Steve Kerr), a radical transformation, a dramatic cultural revolution, and a hoped-for blockbuster product in the “game-changing” acquisition of Shaq.

As the decline of the Phoenix Suns became apparent, they reacted by going in a drastically different direction to try and put them over the top, moving away from what made them so successful.

In Cleveland, it was always about that one more piece. If only they could get a high scoring point guard to pair with LeBron James, or a big man to contend with Dwight Howard, or an increasingly popular “stretch four”. Their grasp for salvation led to the acquisitions of Mo Williams, Shaq, and Antawn Jamison, limited flexibility to rebuild around LeBron, and the departure of LeBron.

In the Spurs, the Richard Jefferson trade is the lone move that might be interpreted as a sign of Stage 4, but even then it’s hard to fault the move and this summer they quickly returned to their roots.

If there remains any panic in Spurs fans, they need to simply take Collins advice under consideration and look at how the Phoenix Suns reversed course last season by returning to what made them great and staying the course. Which has always been my argument for not trading away a piece of the Big Three in haste.

Stage 5: Capitulation to Irrelevance or Death

The longer a company remains in Stage 4, repeatedly grasping for silver bullets, the more likely it will spiral downward. In Stage 5, accumulated setbacks and expensive false starts erode financial strength and individual spirit to such an extent that leaders abandon all hope of building a great future. In some cases the company’s leader just sells out; in other cases the institution atrophies into utter insignificance; and in the most extreme cases the enterprise simply dies outright.

Sadly, for the Cleveland Cavaliers, this appears to be where their beloved basketball franchise has landed. The organization’s leader, LeBron James, abandoned all hope of building a great future and “sold out”, taking his talents to South Beach.

The Spurs might not be at the height of their powers, but they are not mortgaging their future because of it. And because of that, there is always an opportunity for a triumphant return.

The San Antonio Spurs 2010-2011 regular season schedule was released on Tuesday. In what could be the last year (or is that next year?) that the Spurs compete for an NBA title, we take a look at the schedule and see what lies ahead for the silver and black from late October to mid-April.

• San Antonio’s first game of the season is October 27 at home against the Indiana Pacers.
• In December, 11 of the Spurs’ 15 games are at the AT&T Center.
• Jeff McDonald of the Express-News tweeted that the Spurs will be on national TV 22 times next season.
• The Rodeo Road Trip runs nine games from February 1 through 17. The Spurs play Portland, the Lakers, Sacramento, Detroit, Toronto, Philadelphia, Washington, New Jersey and Chicago on the trip. Absent is the usual combination of two straight games in the Staples Center against the Lakers and Clippers. In fact, the Spurs don’t do that two step at all this season. But there are three back-to-back sets on the RRT.
• All-Star Weekend is February 18-20. Will Tim Duncan continue his streak? Will Tony Parker join him? Tiago Splitter vs. DeJuan Blair in the Rookie-Sophomore game? (Yes, please. To all.)
• The heir-to-the-throne Miami Heat make their only regular season visit to the AT&T Center on Friday, March 4. The Lakers make one of their two appearances a couple days later on Sunday, March 6.
• The Spurs play 29 of their 50 games in 2011 on the road (because of the Rodeo Road Trip).
• The silver and black play 18 back-to-backs in 2010-2011. Seven of those are in March and April. Ugh.
• The Spurs’ hardest stretch of games may be the eight game slate from March 23 to April 5. San Antonio plays Denver, Portland, Memphis, Portland again, Boston, Houston, Phoenix and Atlanta. There are two-and-a-half back-to-backs in that stretch (the Atlanta game is the first of another back-to-back) and those teams were a combined 392-264 last season. That span of games may determine where San Antonio ends up in the Western Conference standings.