Figuring Out the Frontcourt

by Graydon Gordian

Some of the most interesting questions facing the coaching staff this season revolve around our big men. The frontcourt has depth and a diversity of skill sets. Figuring out how to organize that depth will be a challenge, although a far more pleasant challenge than figuring how to navigate last season’s lack thereof.

One of the more interesting tactical developments of ’08-09 was our slow and steady movement away from a 3-out, 2-in motion offense to more 4-out, 1-in sets. During the days of Fransisco Elson, Fabricio Oberto, and Robert Horry, you were far more likely to see both bigs line up in or near the paint, whether it be in the high and low post or on either block. But once Matt Bonner was inserted into the starting lineup, you nearly always had all four players aside from Tim Duncan perching themselves along the perimeter. (Horry could be found setting up along the perimeter as well, but his spatial intelligence and passing ability made him a far more flexible tool than Bonner.)

It got to the point where Gregg Popovich was infrequently playing our two traditional bigs (Duncan, Thomas) alongside one another, and oftentimes deploying units with only one true big. Because of Pop’s growing fascination with small ball, we saw Bruce Bowen or Michael Finley at the four a startling amount of the time.

With the additions of Antonio McDyess, DeJuan Blair, and Theo Ratliff, I imagine we’ll see more offensive sets that resemble the pre-2008 Spurs. In both Matt Bonner and Marcus Haislip we have two forwards who will head for the corner reflexively. But Ratliff and Blair are most comfortable on the block, while McDyess and Duncan can execute consistently from either the high or low post. When any two of those four are on the floor simultaneously, 3-2 motion schemes will be the norm.

I’m a much bigger proponent of the 3-2 than I am of the 4-1, and for a number of reasons. In 3-2 sets, our offensive rebounding rate will increase significantly (whether DeJuan Blair is on the floor or not). People always blame our poor offensive rebounding rate on Pop’s commitment to stopping transition baskets but having only one player positioned in the paint is just as much a cause.

It’s not just a question of how much we value second-chance shots, but how much we value high-percentage shots: shot attempts off of offensive rebounds are nearly always taken by players well-positioned near the rim. The Spurs were not only one of the worst offensive rebounding teams in the league last year; we also ranked near the bottom for points in the paint. The two are not unrelated.

In my opinion improved offensive rebounding is just a small part of what makes the 3-2 superior to the 4-1. By the end of last season, our offense had devolved into nothing more than the low-post iso, the high pick-and-roll and 3-pointers off of the inside-outside game.

In theory there is nothing wrong with that, particularly when you have Tim Duncan anchoring the operation. But Tim’s knee issues emboldened opposing teams, and they began doubling him less and less. By staying home on our shooters or more confidently switching onto Parker after Duncan set the high screen, opposing teams forced players ill-equipped to score off the dribble, such as Mason, Finley and Bonner, to improvise. They also put increasing amounts of pressure on Duncan’s worn down body to execute.

By operating out of a 3-2, you don’t necessarily complicate the offense substantially (in fact, Pop has made it clear he wants to keep the playbook relatively minimal) but you create more opportunities for players to instinctively execute simple yet effective plays. For instance, by having a man at both the high and low post, the team is prepared to pick for a man driving from the top of the arc, or cutting along the baseline from the corner. In a 4-1, the team is only setup for one such pick, making the entire play easier to predict and derail.

Similarly, both bigs are well positioned to set screens for one another. When coupled with a cut from either the corner or the top of the arc, the offense forces the defense to confront a confusing amount of movement that is deceptively easy to execute. In February, 2008, the X’s and O’s of Basketball wrote an excellent post breaking down a similar, highly effective play that the Spurs used to run.

Over the course of the offseason, I’ve gotten the impression that this is the direction the offense is headed. When we traded for Jefferson, Popovich remarked that he was glad we finally had a small forward we could “post up,” suggesting that Pop is more committed to scoring in the paint than he was last season. And in Sunday’s open practice, Duncan and Blair played an extended stint at the 4-5. Duncan may have won the post-practice 3-point contest, but I don’t imagine Pop wants either of them setting up beyond the 3-point line all that often.