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Is reducing workload an effective way to increase value?

Tim Duncan averaged over 39 minutes per game in his career before the age of 26. Since then, his minutes have steadily decreased, reaching a career low of 31.3 MPG last year. Despite this decrease in minutes, his production per minute is quite comparable before and after age 26. Clearly, much of this reduction in minutes can be largely associated with age and the wear and tear often associated with aging.

Duncan also averaged over 37 MPG in the playoffs last year, so this reduction in minutes also includes some level of preservation. Soon the Spurs will need to weigh their level of wear and tear for not only Duncan, but Parker, Ginobili and even the Spurs young talent as they balance current contributions with long term conservation.

The issue of measuring career preservation is a tricky task to tackle. In the parallel issue of pitch counts and pitcher burnout in baseball, the debate has often been heated. Over 10 years ago, Rany Jazayerli created a system introducing Pitcher Abuse Points (PAP) in which he suggests weights of abuse on pitchers when they throw over 100 pitches in a game (he seems to focus on young pitchers). Many major league teams appear to make decisions roughly in line with these guidelines.

However, individuals such as Steve Treder have expressed doubts regarding the current pitch count system in place. Even Bill James chimes in, saying that Jazayerli and Woolner’s “research is so flawed that it is virtually useless.” Although it seems logical to assume that fatigued pitchers are more likely to encounter injury problems, there is not a consensus whether or not this tendency should be a significant factor considering taking starting pitchers out of a game.

The problem with analyzing the impact of fatigue on career longevity is that the best players tend to play more games, play longer in each game and have longer careers. This means that players who play more games and minutes (or pitches) also tend to have longer careers, so player ability must be considered at the same time as player “abuse”, which can be easier said than done.

The Method – Predicting Longevity

In order to try to account for this problem, I selected players with at least 2,000 minutes from the ages 28 and 29 and predicted Mean Expected Wins Added (MEWA) beyond age 29 (Mean Expected Championships Added was too variable to yield significant results) using regression analysis.

In this projection, I used an estimate of value per minute (basic statistical plus/minus or SPM), an estimate of perceived value and health (MPG) and a combination of the both (MEWA/gm). The formula I used to predict MEWA after 29 was 85*MEWA/GP + 0.72*MPG + 3.05*SPM +0.95*Max(0,SPM)^2; not below 0.

MEWA, MPG and SPM were cumulative for age 28 and 29. I summarized the data, excluded all players who were expected to have fewer than 10 MEWA after 29 and included only players who turned 30 after 1980 and “retired” before the 2010 season.

Whose Longevity Defied Expectation?

The following table lists MP during ages 28 and 29, predicted Mean Expected Wins Added after 29 (based on performances at 28 and 29), actual Mean Expected Wins Added after 29 and the respective ratio of [Actual Wins/[Expected Wins] entitled “Longevity Ratio”. Games played before 28 and MPG before 28 are also included.

NBA MEWA vs Expected after 29

Player	MP 28,29	Predicted MEWinA30+	Actual MEWinA30+	Longevity Ratio	GPpre28	MPGpre28
Charles Oakley	5048	17	56	326%	384	32.2
Eddie Johnson	4634	14	45	322%	402	32.1
Kevin Willis	4646	17	56	321%	320	27.5
Brent Barry	3907	27	85	310%	155	21.0
Sam Perkins	5528	30	94	309%	317	32.0
Vinnie Johnson	4002	15	42	290%	208	25.2
Dikembe Mutombo	5953	41	112	272%	153	37.5
Mark Jackson	5828	27	73	267%	389	31.4
Buck Williams	5083	23	60	261%	491	36.7
Avery Johnson	4362	21	53	255%	137	11.3
Dell Curry	4114	22	53	245%	337	18.8
Antoine Carr	2291	10	25	243%	224	16.2
Anthony Mason	4399	23	55	243%	187	25.7
Karl Malone	6356	95	223	236%	407	36.3
Tim Hardaway	2321	38	88	232%	308	38.4
Reggie Miller	5592	62	143	231%	402	34.0
Sam Cassell	3004	38	84	222%	209	22.4
Bobby Jackson	3398	22	48	222%	191	21.0
Olden Polynice	3133	13	28	218%	289	13.7
Ricky Pierce	3470	29	62	217%	233	19.6
Dennis Rodman	4585	35	75	213%	159	20.8
Clifford Robinson	5578	41	86	213%	328	25.0
Michael Cage	4736	23	49	211%	385	29.3
Tom Chambers	5698	26	55	207%	389	33.1
Doug Christie	4707	27	56	207%	204	25.8
Bill Laimbeer	5783	40	83	206%	295	30.8
Detlef Schrempf	5237	39	80	204%	342	22.5
P.J. Brown	4954	31	63	202%	240	30.7
Mitch Richmond	4625	28	55	200%	314	37.1
Danny Ferry	2255	14	27	199%	225	18.0
Johnny Newman	4128	13	25	198%	297	23.0
Antonio Davis	4427	18	36	197%	125	22.1
Robert Horry	2936	33	64	195%	317	31.8
Steve Kerr	2077	24	47	191%	209	17.1
Dale Davis	4763	29	55	188%	364	29.7
Eric Piatkowski	2982	17	31	186%	211	13.0
John Stockton	6018	114	210	184%	410	27.6
George Lynch	2802	15	27	181%	244	19.6
Armen Gilliam	4513	19	34	180%	170	30.3
Patrick Ewing	6269	69	120	174%	275	34.3
Vlade Divac	5310	35	60	172%	441	29.3
Jeff Hornacek	5811	57	96	169%	307	27.9
A.c. Green	5066	29	49	169%	407	28.6
Scottie Pippen	5882	72	120	166%	398	33.6
Anthony Peeler	2493	17	28	164%	253	22.7
Sedale Threatt	2701	24	39	162%	251	18.1
Frank Brickowski	2310	16	25	160%	118	12.1
Tyrone Corbin	6207	28	45	160%	155	18.4
Hersey Hawkins	5383	36	58	159%	403	36.1
Dale Ellis	5980	41	65	158%	293	22.3
Bob Sura	3462	10	16	157%	330	22.5
James Donaldson	2833	18	27	154%	314	22.3
Kurt Rambis	3087	17	26	153%	271	19.5
Ruben Patterson	3305	11	17	151%	256	23.7
Mark West	2934	22	33	150%	180	15.1
Chuck Person	5908	16	24	150%	398	35.3
Otis Thorpe	5986	30	46	149%	403	31.7
Ron Harper	6114	33	50	148%	267	35.2
David Wesley	4693	31	45	144%	267	26.3
Antonio Daniels	2384	23	33	143%	350	22.9
Dominique Wilkins	5945	54	77	142%	401	36.7
Gary Payton	6375	84	118	141%	409	32.4
Hakeem Olajuwon	4698	93	129	139%	468	36.6
Donyell Marshall	4078	41	56	137%	348	25.6
Aaron Williams	2003	15	21	136%	87	9.8
Mark Eaton	5364	24	33	135%	163	22.5
Dan Majerle	6406	46	63	135%	286	30.5
Hotrod Williams	4069	35	47	134%	239	29.1
Joe Dumars	6238	33	44	133%	387	31.3
Kevin Mchale	5050	57	76	133%	328	27.1
Craig Ehlo	4761	27	36	133%	211	14.5
Nick Van Exel	4752	21	28	132%	378	34.8
Cuttino Mobley	6159	29	38	131%	209	33.3
Danny Ainge	5517	44	56	129%	359	24.3
Gerald Henderson	4736	20	25	127%	322	18.8
Horace Grant	5315	52	66	126%	399	32.3
Clarence Weatherspoon	2075	26	33	126%	400	37.1
Byron Scott	5198	35	43	125%	394	30.2
John Starks	4534	40	50	124%	179	20.2
John Paxson	3626	15	18	124%	284	21.0
Trent Tucker	2939	20	24	122%	295	22.6
Jerome Kersey	5202	37	45	120%	393	25.1
Clyde Drexler	5535	79	94	119%	478	33.0
Derrick Coleman	2397	30	36	118%	292	35.4
Stacey Augmon	2586	18	21	118%	313	30.6
Rod Strickland	5156	50	58	117%	325	27.6
Eddie Jones	3531	76	88	115%	294	34.3
Danny Schayes	3722	23	26	115%	332	17.7
Larry Nance	3475	65	75	115%	378	30.9
Brian Shaw	3873	11	12	114%	246	28.9
Greg Buckner	2225	12	14	114%	204	20.3
Elden Campbell	5215	37	42	114%	361	22.5
David Robinson	6452	135	152	113%	232	37.3
Lorenzen Wright	3656	13	14	113%	383	25.0
Jimmy Jackson	2433	13	14	112%	274	36.4
Greg Anthony	3039	30	33	112%	232	22.4
Charlie Ward	3873	33	37	112%	151	17.2
Glen Rice	6156	46	51	111%	396	35.5
Charles Barkley	5379	97	106	110%	468	37.1
Derek Harper	5975	51	55	109%	402	29.0
Aaron McKie	4346	23	25	108%	241	22.0
Danny Manning	2435	27	29	108%	331	33.5
Chris Whitney	2068	16	17	107%	250	12.2
Matt Harpring	3718	21	22	107%	269	29.3
Wesley Person	3398	20	21	106%	322	30.8
Larry Bird	6189	105	112	106%	320	37.8
Rod Higgins	4075	23	25	106%	303	20.6
Steve Smith	5675	42	45	106%	269	33.9
Greg Ostertag	2601	13	13	102%	326	20.6
Bryon Russell	3989	38	38	101%	270	18.8
Rodney Rogers	3254	26	26	100%	383	27.4
Allan Houston	4984	24	24	99%	400	30.3
Damon Jones	4592	32	32	98%	211	16.8
Bo Outlaw	3187	29	28	96%	362	23.9
Terry Porter	5449	76	72	95%	402	31.8
Gerald Wilkins	4508	14	13	95%	405	30.9
Dudley Bradley	2074	11	11	95%	286	19.3
Chris Mullin	6661	56	53	95%	357	32.8
Fred Hoiberg	3092	28	27	95%	139	11.6
Terry Mills	4170	20	18	94%	260	26.7
Nate Mcmillan	3629	37	35	93%	388	27.2
Rik Smits	4494	32	30	93%	395	25.3
Terry Cummings	5645	40	37	93%	470	34.5
Alton Lister	4100	21	19	92%	323	22.0
Jeff Malone	4985	19	17	91%	397	32.7
Muggsy Bogues	5579	33	30	90%	402	27.9
Orlando Woolridge	3260	23	21	89%	354	29.4
Vinny Delnegro	4309	28	24	88%	229	21.6
Rick Fox	5359	27	23	88%	368	22.7
Mike Gminski	3466	30	26	88%	444	22.9
Christian Laettner	5422	38	32	85%	262	34.3
Adonal Foyle	2359	16	13	84%	312	18.8
Mookie Blaylock	5962	71	59	83%	355	34.2
Grant Long	2263	31	26	83%	401	31.4
Howard Eisley	4522	17	14	82%	294	16.5
Damon Stoudamire	5453	31	25	81%	301	36.6
Pooh Richardson	3885	14	11	80%	320	34.5
Larry Smith	4815	18	15	80%	360	30.0
Alonzo Mourning	3692	60	48	80%	351	35.9
Thurl Bailey	5360	20	16	80%	406	29.1
Chris Gatling	2035	30	24	80%	206	15.3
George Mccloud	3648	29	23	80%	247	15.7
Sherman Douglas	4837	18	14	79%	238	29.7
Spud Webb	4921	25	20	77%	357	18.2
Corliss Williamson	2500	18	14	75%	337	25.2
Sam Bowie	2619	19	14	75%	119	29.5
Reggie Williams	5345	29	21	73%	130	19.9
Tyrone Hill	3511	28	20	72%	357	25.2
Magic Johnson	5541	100	72	72%	487	36.9
Dee Brown	2113	18	13	72%	349	30.8
Jason Williams	3290	16	11	72%	259	12.2
Doc Rivers	3988	56	40	71%	365	29.4
Kelvin Cato	3167	20	14	70%	217	17.3
Randy Breuer	2771	16	11	69%	293	16.4
Derrick Mckey	5423	27	19	69%	446	31.3
Rolando Blackman	5338	29	20	69%	401	32.4
Kendall Gill	3617	38	26	68%	382	31.0
Eric Snow	3967	28	19	68%	257	22.6
Herb Williams	5296	25	17	68%	304	31.7
Shawn Bradley	3902	30	21	68%	289	28.6
Toni Kukoc	3713	73	49	68%	156	28.2
Brian Grant	4093	22	15	67%	291	30.0
Terrell Brandon	2289	49	32	67%	457	26.6
Harvey Grant	4779	21	14	66%	293	28.2
Jerome Williams	2017	25	17	66%	242	19.6
Dana Barros	5646	38	25	65%	372	20.1
Scott Brooks	2741	18	11	64%	316	14.0
Mark Blount	2920	17	10	63%	108	14.0
Mark Aguirre	5273	45	29	63%	365	33.8
Michael Jordan	6136	201	126	63%	427	39.0
John Salley	3196	17	10	62%	387	21.9
Antoine Walker	3667	26	16	62%	528	39.4
Larry Johnson	5025	26	16	62%	377	38.8
Kevin Johnson	3801	45	27	61%	387	36.6
Kevin Gamble	4421	21	12	60%	288	22.9
Tom Gugliotta	4713	36	22	60%	243	35.6
Xavier Mcdaniel	2873	20	12	58%	393	33.7
Adrian Griffin	2753	19	11	58%	116	19.9
Vernon Maxwell	4822	28	16	57%	271	31.4
Paul Pressey	4761	46	25	56%	240	25.6
Nick Anderson	4880	48	25	53%	447	31.9
Kiki Vandeweghe	5820	37	19	51%	365	33.7
Isiah Thomas	5917	37	19	51%	555	36.7
Rex Chapman	3323	32	16	50%	320	29.5
Jalen Rose	6097	26	13	49%	438	25.2
Ed Pinckney	3082	33	16	49%	345	19.7
James Worthy	5920	49	23	48%	471	31.9
Chris Morris	3480	30	14	48%	389	30.3
Kenny Smith	4631	29	14	47%	334	34.2
Jamal Mashburn	5817	35	16	46%	286	35.3
Chris Webber	4910	75	35	46%	405	37.7
Sleepy Floyd	3468	38	17	44%	366	32.1
Shawn Kemp	5519	36	16	44%	544	29.2
Vern Fleming	4805	26	11	44%	398	33.1
Wally Szczerbiak	3733	47	20	42%	317	33.4
Derek Anderson	4418	36	15	42%	250	31.5
Travis Best	4148	28	11	40%	266	19.6
Sean Elliott	4294	31	12	39%	469	34.3
Mark Price	4518	80	31	39%	311	31.7
Shareef Abdur-Rahim	2596	30	11	37%	533	38.1
Lafayette Lever	5806	72	26	36%	404	30.3
Alvin Robertson	5197	46	16	35%	389	32.2
Michael Adams	5141	43	14	33%	319	30.4
Jay Humphries	5544	39	12	30%	335	29.4
Sidney Moncrief	5301	59	17	28%	392	32.5
Anfernee Hardaway	4197	43	12	27%	319	36.9
Kerry Kittles	4550	49	13	26%	267	34.8
Stephon Marbury	5475	43	10	24%	505	38.4

The upper part of this list is littered with names that came into the NBA with little expectations and went on to have long, successful careers. Perhaps a late start tends to produce a later than expected finish. Could this be driven by matured players who enter the NBA with fundamentals that last late in their NBA lifetime?

The bottom of the list is full of players with injury-riddled careers. Note that I excluded players with fewer than 10 actual MEWA after 29. Many such players either returned to Europe before their skills or health greatly diminished. Others saw their careers end under tragic non-basketball related circumstances. I accounted for neither of these factors explicitly in my projection of MEWA after 29 and foreign players could especially skew the results. Increasing the minimum actual MEWA effectively eliminated these types of individuals.

Observations

The following is a graph displaying the averages of MP during ages 28 and 29 and Games Played and MPG before 28 for the top and bottom halves of the initial list (labeled “exceed” and “burnout”):

Notice that although average minutes during ages 28 and 29 are higher for those who exceed expectations, cumulative career MPG AND GP up to age 27 are actually LOWER by a statistically significant margin. In fact, I estimate that saving a seasonâ€™s worth of games before 28 corresponds with an increase of about 12% career effectiveness after 29 (using regression analysis weighted by expected MEWA). Similarly, saving 5 MPG before 28 typically results in an increase in career effectiveness of roughly 6% after 29.

However, considering both of these variables simultaneously reduces these variables to about 10% and 2%. To try to put this in perspective, I did a quick estimate and found that the typical 82 games “saved” before age 28 tend to add, over the course of their career, about 1/4 of the wins contributed by that player for an 82 game season.

Clearly, resting the second of back-to back road games or games when nursing an injury would be expected to have a more significant impact on career longevity. Most games in which such a player is not required to rest, but considered for rest by the team or player, fit these circumstances. Therefore, the above estimates really suggest that a season’s worth of borderline, “Should I play or should I rest?” games before age 28 tend to improve career effectiveness by 12% for the age of 30 and beyond.

Additionally, one might suspect that as players age, the 12% improvement in career effectiveness increases; but since the time available to make up the lost player contributions for a season are lessened, these players might “only” be expected to add 1/4 or less of one season’s wins contributed over the course of their career. (See the end of last week’s post for a basic expectation of the Spurs player’s future contributions.)

The aforementioned decrease of the impact of MPG when combined with GP in the regression model indicates the correlation of MPG and GP. The fact that GP is less affected suggests to me that MPG might be largely reduced because of injury, when minutes are most significantly reduced in line with a reduction in games played. Maybe players who give injuries more time to recover instead of pushing through last longer. Perhaps these players just know how to take care of their bodies. The tendency for players recovering from injury to perform at lower levels adds to the list of reasons to not rush a return.

From a coaching or organizational perspective, much else must be considered in addition to games and minutes played for each individual. Just to name a few, factors such as how a player is feeling, team need, medical advise all play significant roles. Unfortunately the available data doesn’t seem good enough to shed any more light on potential factors causing the results in my study.

Reducing Player Minutes

You might be thinking “Ok, great. So now there is support for the widely accepted theory that saving players prolongs careers, now what? Sitting the best players hurts the team for the current game and season.” There is at least one more important factor must be considered. Not all minutes are created equal.

Clearly, playing Duncan at the end of a 30-point blowout does more harm than good, so in order to maximize his impact given his “allotted minutes” (not that there should be a hard number), he should play in as many high leverage situations that fit his skill set as possible. My article on Clutch Adjusted Plus/Minus displays the comeback probabilities given the deficit and time remaining (see Comeback Probability Table).

Weighing minutes played by the impact of 3 points on comeback probability, we do find that the best players typically play a higher percentage of the teamâ€™s minutes. The following chart shows the differences between the Spurs player’s percentages of team minutes and clutch-weighted minutes:

And finally, here is a table of some select players:

Player	Tm	GP	MP	%MP	%Clutch Wt MP	Diff
Beno Udrih	SAC	79	2477	65%	80%	16%
Jason Terry	DAL	77	2540	68%	82%	14%
Jason Kidd	DAL	80	2881	74%	87%	13%
Kevin Garnett	BOS	69	2060	62%	70%	9%
LeBron James	CLE	76	2966	81%	89%	8%
Tim Duncan	SAS	78	2438	65%	73%	8%
Dwyane Wade	MIA	77	2792	75%	83%	8%
Steve Nash	PHO	81	2660	68%	75%	7%
Monta Ellis	GSW	64	2647	86%	92%	6%
Kobe Bryant	LAL	73	2835	80%	86%	6%
Kevin Durant	OKC	82	3239	82%	88%	6%
Dwight Howard	ORL	82	2843	72%	77%	5%
Manu Ginobili	SAS	75	2150	59%	64%	5%
Andre Iguodala	PHI	82	3192	81%	85%	4%
Rudy Gay	MEM	80	3175	82%	86%	4%
Richard Jefferson	SAS	81	2520	64%	68%	3%
George Hill	SAS	78	2276	60%	63%	3%
Gerald Wallace	CHR	76	3119	85%	87%	3%
Tony Parker	SAS	56	1728	64%	66%	2%
Antonio McDyess	SAS	77	1617	44%	43%	0%
Malik Hairston	SAS	47	317	14%	11%	-3%
Keith Bogans	SAS	79	1559	41%	38%	-3%
Matt Bonner	SAS	65	1161	37%	34%	-3%
Aaron Brooks	HOU	82	2919	73%	70%	-3%
Roger Mason	SAS	79	1515	40%	36%	-4%
Luis Scola	HOU	82	2671	67%	62%	-5%
Marcus Haislip	SAS	10	44	9%	4%	-5%
Ian Mahinmi	SAS	26	165	13%	5%	-8%
DeJuan Blair	SAS	82	1494	38%	29%	-8%
Mike Miller	WAS	54	1805	69%	59%	-10%

Notice how the better and/or older often are at the top of the [clutch-weighted minutes â€“ actual minutes] list. It is also interesting to note that two of the most historically statistically-oriented teams are in opposite ends of the spectrum. The Mavs are arguably the team whose best playerâ€™s clutch-weighted minutes increase the most. Meanwhile, the Rockets best player’s clutch-weighted minutes seem to increase the least (or even decrease).

This could be somehow related to Daryl Moreyâ€™s comments on last yearâ€™s Sloan Sports Conference that the Rockets donâ€™t make decisions accounting for clutch performance, to which Mark Cuban chimed in saying that his team has accounted for this factor in the past. Or it could just be because the Rockets have more role players who donâ€™t always fit in â€œclutchâ€ situations while the Mavs have older players on a more top-heavy team.

In summary, the Spurs best players can be effectively utilized over the long haul if Coach Popovich adequately focuses on resting key players during injury-related times, typically coinciding with events that have a low probability of impacting the Spurs’ 2011 results. I’m sure Coach Pop would not be surprised at all by this by this effect, but attaching some magnitude to this result, even a vague magnitude, can help with adjusting or assuring instinctive decision making. With the future in mind, perhaps Duncan, Ginobili and Parker shouldnâ€™t play elite minutes for the Spurs this year, but still play elite â€œeffective minutesâ€ if healthy.

36 Comments

Alix Babaie

September 24, 2010

Huh? Just kidding…nice article and good insight on how reducing workload at key times can help or hurt, depending on the personnel and the age of the players.
BlaseE

September 24, 2010

Two Things:

1. Your last graph shows Tim, Manu, RJ, Hill, and Parker in that order of decreased (Clutch%MP – %MP) as our top used “clutch” lineup which coincides with what I observed last year. I’m not sure Tiago cracks this top 5 this season which further supports my claims that Pop will use small to close games, especially when we are trailing. RJ can vastly improve the Spurs chances if he has worked on playing small ball 4 within our system over the summer.

2. I get the logic behind wanting to maximize your best players talent against the best teams in the closest of situations. I counter with this: a regular season win against the Nets is equal to a regular season win against the Lakers. Let’s say the Spurs are expected to win against the Lakers 40% of the time compared to 90% of the time against the Nets with our full lineup. I think there is value in securing easy wins and a coach testing his role players against better teams. You can see this in how Pop is so willing to rest Duncan in games like the OKC game last season and when he rested all the starters on the Rodeo Road Trip @ Denver the year before.

So my point is, we need Duncan and Manu to play against the worst teams so they are never clutch situations. We then should be in a W-L record situation to not allow an opposing good team to dictate our rotation or player minutes which should lower the Clutch%MP for our most valuable players.

Last season, injuries and other factors forced a poor record which then forced Pop to not rest Duncan and Manu.

I guess these are just some of the details a head coach must balance.
Tyler

September 24, 2010

That makes sense. Limit (or reduce) the Big 3′s overall minutes played, while maintaining (or even increasing) their critical minutes played.
Scott Sereday

September 24, 2010

BlaseE,

I can see some potential long term value in “testing” role players against better teams. I also understand that more difficult tasks might have a more significant impact on wear and tear. But in terms of getting wins, Lakers are closer to 50% and would be a higher leverage situation.

Let me illustrate:
For simplicity, I’ll assume the Spurs average 100 PPG against all teams and all of Duncan’s impact is all on the defensive end. Let’s also assume the Spur’s winning percentages of 40% and 90% against the Lakers and Nets are without Duncan (this just makes the pattern more obvious). Finally, let’s say that the Spurs expect to allow 6 fewer points in games Duncan plays, against all matchups.

Without Duncan:
Lakers W%=40% => Avg Score 100-102.9
Nets W%=90% => Avg Score 100-85.5

With Duncan:
Lakers Avg Score 100-96.9 => W%=61%
Nets Avg Score 100-79.5 => W%=96%

Expected Difference:
Playing against Lakers = 61%-40% = 0.21 Wins Added
Playing against Lakers = 96%-90% =0.06 Wins Added

We can see that Duncan playing agains the Lakers can be expected to be worth over 3 times as much as against the Nets.
DieHardSpur

September 24, 2010

Damnit Scott,

Still over my head!
Greyberger

September 24, 2010

‘cept Blase is advocating the opposite, play the ‘starters’ to secure early leads against bad teams, play the ‘role players’ more than usual in clutch situations, against both bad and good teams. Critical/Clutch minutes aren’t bad for veterans, but they might be good for rookies…

Of course fate will probably push Pop’s hand with injuries or setbacks or surprises. In practice, it wouldn’t look much different than what we saw last year. I just hope everybody stays healthy so strategy like this be a reality.
Greyberger

September 24, 2010

above RE: tyler, not scott
BlaseE

September 24, 2010

Thanks for the follow up. My point is that you are looking at wins added but I’m talking about wins lost. If you play Duncan in one game, wouldn’t you rather have a .96 wins lost as secure as possible compared to .61 wins lost.

Let’s say Duncan plays in 1 game. If he plays in the Lakers game, you could expect 1.51 wins out of the 2 games, but you have a higher chance of losing both games in a small sample size (like 1 set of games). If he plays in the Nets game, it drops to 1.36 wins out of 2 games, but you’ve given yourself the best chance to secure 1 win. I think my point would be stronger if it wasn’t the Nets at 90% which should be a guaranteed win in most people’s eyes. Let’s say instead a team like New Orleans where we might have a .75% chance to win last season (yes, I’m aware we won all 4 games). I think you want Duncan to secure the Hornets win and you risk the Lakers loss in a back to back situation.

I think you’re numbers make more sense when you are looking at reducing minutes over an entire season. I’m just trying to rationalize the team you rest Duncan/Manu/Parker against on a single back to back.

I’m thinking there are games against poorer competition where Duncan can secure a win in 25 minutes of PT, but in order to get to close games against good competition, Duncan may need to play 35+ minutes. To me, its more important to not lose the little games than it is to win the big games (especially within your conference).
DieHardSpur

September 24, 2010

Blase – Good explanition…
rj

September 24, 2010

not a big fan of these articles. were you guys all political science majors?
Jim Henderson

September 24, 2010

Greyberger
September 24th, 2010 at 11:44 am

â€˜cept Blase is advocating the opposite, play the â€˜startersâ€™ to secure early leads against bad teams, play the â€˜role playersâ€™ more than usual in clutch situations, against both bad and good teams. Critical/Clutch minutes arenâ€™t bad for veterans, but they might be good for rookiesâ€¦”

Very good point.

BlaseE
September 24th, 2010 at 12:05 pm

“Iâ€™m thinking there are games against poorer competition where Duncan can secure a win in 25 minutes of PT, but in order to get to close games against good competition, Duncan may need to play 35+ minutes. To me, its more important to not lose the little games than it is to win the big games (especially within your conference).”

Yes, point well-taken. During the regular season of course. The playoffs are a different story. And that’s a key consideration: How many minutes do we play what players in what type of games to best prepare the TEAM for an upcoming playoff run. For example, if we were to get in a long playoff run, we cannot afford to play TD 37-40 mpg. in a HIGHLY active role against the toughest competition. We’ll burn him out by the 2nd round at this stage of his career (e.g., 2010 Suns series), regardless of how much rest we could possibly afford him during the regular season. Thus, while it makes sense to play our older, “important” players less on average during the regular season & playoffs, more importantly we must aggressively develop our younger players during the regular season (play them enough overall, and in tight situations against high-level competition) so that they’re capable of making key contributions with meaningful minutes during the playoffs.

Scott’s data supports the notion of resting injured players (even if relatively minor) where at all possible, and play the team’s best performers heavier minutes in clutch situations against tough competition. Generally speaking, I agree with that assessment, particularly when a team’s top performers are relatively young, durable, and injury free. However, it is my belief (based merely on observation) that Duncan & Ginobli (our two top performers) are no longer as effective at this stage of their careers when playing too many minutes against difficult competition over too short of a period of time. An extended, hard fought playoff run to the WCF’s would be an example of this. As a result, in my view, it is crucial for this team to push the development of a handful of key young players on the team (e.g., Hill, Blair, Splitter, Anderson….) to the point where one or more of them turn into consistent & strong producers against tough competition in key situations during a big game (as close to simulating during the regular season what one can expect in a playoff series). And I would employ this approach even if it ended up costing us a handful of games, and a 6th seed instead of a 3rd seed (losing home court in round one, and probably beyond). We are simply no longer in the position to have Duncan & Ginobli carry us by playing “heavy” minutes (i.e., averaging more than 34-35 mpg.) through several back-to-back hard-fought playoff series against elite competition. We need to accept this reality and make the appropriate adjustments if we plan on getting a realistic crack at the WCF’s.
Scott Sereday

September 24, 2010

Right, it is all about making moves that improve the odds of winning a title.

I’m going to second or third that BlaseE’s well summarizing his perspective:

â€œIâ€™m thinking there are games against poorer competition where Duncan can secure a win in 25 minutes of PT, but in order to get to close games against good competition, Duncan may need to play 35+ minutes. To me, its more important to not lose the little games than it is to win the big games (especially within your conference).”

This is logical, but I wouldn’t suspect that this strategy will make up for the lost value over those two games.

If Coach Pop feels like Duncan can really benefit from the rest of back-to-back road games, then perhaps a good solution would be to have TD come off the bench for the tougher game, assuming he can adjust that role. That way, he can use him sparingly initially and more when the game is in the balance or potentially not at all if the game is never is serious question.
AP

September 24, 2010

Glad to have your insightful analysis. Keep it up.
Tyler

September 24, 2010

@Greyberger

I was responding to the Scott’s piece, not BlasE
Jim Henderson

September 24, 2010

I have to say, though complicated, this deal could go down. However, if Anthony does not agree to sign a long-term extension, there’s NO way this deal goes through. I think he will sign, but it’s not like this would make the Net’s a juggernaut, a la the Heat, so it’s a big decision for Anthony. He could just as well wait and try to get to NY next summer. It depends on how bad he wants to get out of Denver, and the way he perceives the upcoming CBA fight, and looming lock out.

http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=5610989
R Ybarra

September 24, 2010

There are lies, then there are Damn lies, then there are statistics. I had to listen into the late summer after the Spurs had won it all. I felt like sorry for the Lakers, because Shaq and Kobe were breaking up. (Not) What is this broken Back? The worst kind of liar, is the arragant one. Mean while, back at the ranch. If Tony was as nasty Jacque Vaughn, We would win another Title. Remmember when Tony was the only player to shut down Richard of Detroit. I like my Spurs like my coffie. Black and sassy. I wonder If Avery were coaching, if would he allow Pop not to play zone. If would have played Zone against the Suns, we would not have been swept. We would compete, but it would have come down to the low post game against the Lakers. I remmember, when Shaq and Kobe came to town. Duncan and Tony were out. Manu beat the Lakers, by himeself. He is the best point guard, that plays out of position. Jason Kidd, Jerry West, Manu. If I could not have Jordan, I would want Manu. Go Spurs Go
Jim Henderson

September 24, 2010

http://espn.go.com/nba/powerrankings

Stein’s usually pretty good, but I take issue with him on his “preseason power rankings”. Just for fun, here’s my power rankings:

Playoff Teams:

LA
Magic
Celtics
Heat
Rockets
Bulls
Blazers
Spurs
Mavs
Thunder
Jazz
Bucks
Nuggets
Hawks
NY

Possible fight for 8th spot/.500 record : +/- 5:

Suns (Amare big loss, but Nash makes everyone better)
Griz (solid young talent with a nice young coach)
Cats (what can I say, it’s Larry Brown’s team!)
Hornets (he’s baaacckk….!)
Clips (Griffin will awe people)
Kings (better than people think)
Cavs (will surprise under Byron Scott, minus Bron)
76ers (Collin’s has this team on the move)

Improvement for some: Still bottom of barrel

Pacers
Wiz
Warriors
Nets (*with Anthony trade, could move to next level)
Pistons
Raptors
T-Wolves
Jim Henderson

September 24, 2010

“Cats (what can I say, itâ€™s Larry Brownâ€™s team!)”

Actually, as of now, my power rankings make the Bobcats the 8th seed in the East.
rob

September 25, 2010

Jim Henderson

“An extended, hard fought playoff run to the WCFâ€™s would be an example of this. As a result, in my view, it is crucial for this team to push the development of a handful of key young players on the team (e.g., Hill, Blair, Splitter, Andersonâ€¦.) to the point where one or more of them turn into consistent & strong producers against tough competition in key situations during a big game (as close to simulating during the regular season what one can expect in a playoff series). And I would employ this approach even if it ended up costing us a handful of games, and a 6th seed instead of a 3rd seed (losing home court in round one, and probably beyond). We are simply no longer in the position to have Duncan & Ginobli carry us by playing â€œheavyâ€ minutes (i.e., averaging more than 34-35 mpg.) through several back-to-back hard-fought playoff series against elite competition. We need to accept this reality and make the appropriate adjustments if we plan on getting a realistic crack at the WCFâ€™s.”

I agree 100% with this analysis.

And by playing the younger talent more against elite teams/players they (the younger talent) get exposed to the tendacies of the best prior to playoff rounds.

And if the circumstances are the same as last year being that the total win/loss record of teams entering the playoffs are but a 2 to 3 game difference…losing a couple of games to an elite team during the regular season while securing expected wins should not hender the ability to win in the playoffs. All the while helping the younger talent to perform better against the elite teams and the playoffs through baptism by fire during the regular season and providing ample rest during the regular season of the big three so as to be as fresh as possible for the playoffs.
rob

September 25, 2010

@ Scott Sereday

This model shows how to best extend longevity.

It would be interesting to see a model showing player efficientcy against elite teams and below average teams. Taking into account how a player like Duncan, Ginobili or Parker performs against those types of teams.

Upon recollection…players may have a great 1st quarter then descend to a below average performance for the rest of the game or have a subpar performance for 3 periods only to have an above average performance in the last quarter.

I’m sure there’s a mental factor that allows great players to just turn it on. And I’m not sure how this would coincide with the top three playing limited minutes. Are these players that good that if they were to be injected into a game at ANYTIME they could still perform according to their respected averages?

I’m sure that would have a bearing upon making a decision to playing others on the team over Duncan and Ginobili.
Jim Henderson

September 25, 2010

Just FYI, this piece by Scott got a mention today by ESPN’s Abbott on his True Hoop Blog. Here’s Abbott’s comment:

“A big mess of data confirming the idea that resting players does prolong the productive part of their careers. One of the side points was that players who get a late start to their careers tend to be productive for a surprisingly long time. I wonder if that’s because those guys — almost never blue-chippers, and often without perfect NBA bodies — need every trick in the book to compete. Maybe the learned habits that get them in the league, from a good diet to trickery fighting for rebounds — are the things that keep them productive.”
Jim Henderson

September 25, 2010

Many of you may have heard, but here’s brief synopsis of the new rule change for this year regarding technical foul calls:

http://espn.go.com/blog/truehoop

For the upcoming season, NBA referees have been instructed to call automatic technical fouls when players do some things that are very common to the NBA game:

* Aggressive gestures, such as air punches, anywhere on the court.
* Demonstrative disagreement, such as when a player incredulously raises his hands, or smacks his own arm to demonstrate how he was fouled.
* Running directly at an official to complain about a call.
* Excessive inquiries about a call, even in a civilized tone.

I think the rule is stupid. What do you guys think?
B Burke

September 26, 2010

It’s nonsense.

1.) If the rule is intended to placate those sports fans who can’t stand the NBA because ‘there’s too much complaining’ (or flopping or whatever), then I think it’s a mistake. That line of thinking (that basketball is rendered unwatchable by all those disrespectful/undisciplined/egotistical whiners) is fixated on behaviors that have very little to do with the game itself.

I understand that the NBA wants to market itself to those fans, but there’s a difference between courting them by banning informal dress on the bench (with which I nonetheless take issue) and punishing extremely common on-court behavior. Unlike flopping, arguing with foul calls does not break up the flow of the game. It also seems that the refs and the players for the most part have a mutual understanding of how to appropriately disagree, and how to appropriately ignore a complaint. Sure, we’ve seen that understanding break down on either side of the whistle (spectacularly between Tim Duncan and Joey Crawford) but I don’t think that tightening the leash on the players is the best way to prevent that from happening.

2.) On the other hand, if the refs feel that they’re unable to make the appropriate calls, or they feel consistently threatened or disrespected as a group because of the way players respond to fouls, I guess it’s worth a shot. In all fairness, their job is extremely difficult and if this might make it any easier, I can’t complain (heh). I always feel like officials need to get a break every now and then. They’re on the road every night (no homestands for refs), trying to call a game to the satisfaction of two opposing teams, a home crowd and the folks at home, knowing complete accuracy is both expected and impossible.

If they go through with this, however, I think it’s only fair that the players, coaches, owners et. al. are allowed to specifically criticize the officiating off the court without fear of reprisal from the league office. Knowing full well that this will never happen, they should abandon the whole thing.
rob

September 26, 2010

The rules aren’t the problem in basketball. It’s the inconsistancy in which they’re applied.

This will yet be another instance of many instances where gray area will rule the judgement of the officials on the court. And just another tool fans will use suggesting the NBA favors certain teams making it to the finals.
spursfanbayarea

September 26, 2010

This happens every few years where the league says they are going to crack down on players behaviors. You will see an increase in technicals initially but as the season goes on it will go back to normal. Its the leagues way of saving face and trying to show that they care about every opinion of every fan. It will be the same as when they started to call carrying on everyone and then they stopped. No biggie.
duaneofly

September 26, 2010

If the refs called the rules the same for everyone, regardless of whether or not they are Kobe, Lebron, Duncan, or Brian Scalabrine, Tony Battie, or Eddie House, than players might actually stop complaining so much.
Nothing irritates me more than hearing commentators and espn writers say “He deserves those calls because he’s a superstar.” No, he doesn’t. A foul should be a foul no matter who you are.
It seems like there’s always a good 10+ games a year (that I see) where one team can throw elbows and push, with no fouls, but the other team can’t even breathe without being whistled.

I know as a fan I’d rather see more consistent officiate, rather than see players not be able to complain. Hell, even if it was bad calls, as long as they are called the same, on both teams, all the time, I wouldn’t mind *so* much.
BlaseE

September 27, 2010

@ Scott

I think you are dead on. With the new goal to secure playoff seeding, Pop should start Duncan/Manu against the weaker team and play him off the bench against the harder team in back to backs.

I think Pop would be more likely to start Duncan the first game and bench him the second game though.

I think I read it on 48MoH going into last season the idea of resting Duncan or Manu in the first game and then flipping it for the second. They could be a good idea but instead of not dressing, benching.
Badger

September 27, 2010

The part of this whole “rest or play” analysis that seems to be lacking is that good coaches, like Pop, will be in constant communication with all the players (and his assistant coaches)about how the players are feeling, day to day, or even minute to minute, in games.

If George Hill is still really sore because of a fall in the lane on the road 3 nights ago, that may be much more important to Pop for tonight’s game than whether Tim played 32 or 37 minutes in the last game, as long as Tim is (honestly) saying that he feels really good tonight.

In other words, the whole thing comes down to making sure ALL factors are considered, not just how old someone is. For example, wouldn’t a fractured finger on a great shooter be more problematic for playing time purposes than the same fractured finger on a big who plays great defense and scores 70% of his points on dunks, tip ins, and layups?

The good coaches are paid very, very well, and it’s almost certain that they are way more plugged in to the situation than simply counting minutes and looking at a guy’s date of birth.
Jim Henderson

September 27, 2010

It appears that Parker is open to an extension, a la Manu last season. We’ll see.

http://twitter.com/spurs/statuses/25704965348
Jim Henderson

September 27, 2010

There’s one guy I’ve been mentioning:

http://twitter.com/JMcDonald_SAEN/status/25701506453
Jim Henderson

September 27, 2010

For those of you that would love to see Shaq’s ego cut down a size, apparently there’s no better way than to get a 5th ring for TD:

http://sports.espn.go.com/boston/nba/columns/story?columnist=macmullan_jackie&id=5620537

“But I don’t compete with little guards. I don’t compete with little guys who run around dominating the ball, throwing up 30 shots a night — like D- Wade, Kobe. “Now if Tim Duncan said it, I’d be pissed. He’s the only guy I’m competing with. If Tim Duncan gets five rings, then that gives some writer the chance to say ‘Duncan is the best,’ and I can’t have that.”
Jim Henderson

September 27, 2010

http://blogs.mysanantonio.com/weblogs/courtside/2010/09/camp-roster-fin.html
Jim Henderson

September 27, 2010

http://sports.yahoo.com/nba/news;_ylt=Al_0YZZ8xBCdbjhE2Yg6TSq8vLYF?slug=ap-spurs-parker

It could simply come down to price (unless we find a killer deal for him). Can’t afford to over-pay for Parker at this juncture, and the contract would have to be back-loaded to the max until TD’s contract comes off in 2012.
anonymous

September 28, 2010

resting players don’t prolong their careers, working hard prolongs you and your career. Keeping players out of dangerous situations and resting them during dangerous times prolongs their careers for injuries are the main thing that ends careers. That’s why they should have kept Bowen. He’s a freak who never gets injured. They oughta call him back now.
rob

September 28, 2010

anonymous

“resting players donâ€™t prolong their careers, working hard prolongs you and your career. Keeping players out of dangerous situations and resting them during dangerous times prolongs their careers for injuries are the main thing that ends careers. Thatâ€™s why they should have kept Bowen. Heâ€™s a freak who never gets injured. They oughta call him back now.”

From someone accustomed to speaking from emotion at times….You’re talking out of your pie hole instead of basing what you just said on any relevant fact.
anonymous

September 29, 2010

Everything I said above is a relevant fact meaning true. Truth is generally not considered a virtue held by statisticians. How can you post without a name? Maybe you are the statistician writing this stuff. All these conclusions based on stats reminds me of these people in fantasy land playing G.M. based on their stat sheet. An ounce of wisdom can half way around the world before a pound of knowledge can get his britches on.

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