Sham on the Spurs’ Cap
Sham Sports has potheads. Sham has lookalikes. Sham has the best collection of quotes on the internet–quick, someone ask Antoine Walker why he shoots so many three pointers. And did you ever want to know what became of Hollinger wonder-crush Jackie Butler? Sham has that too. But it’s all for kicks and giggles. Shamsports.com is a must consult bookmark for serious NBA fans, or simply those who care too much about “stuff involving frauleins.” It’s all carefully managed by a guy named Mark, who is, like it or not, the best the British have to offer. Mark was kind enough to provide us with this guest post.
The San Antonio Spurs have often been accused of being boring. Devoid of much swag, the team features lots of high pick and rolls and quick closeouts on jumpshooters, but few fast break dunks and shots blocked into a cheerleader’s face. The team is not filled with explosive athletes or fixated with measurements; instead, appropriately sized players concentrate on off-hands and perimeter footwork. They’ll grind it out if they have to; the Spurs ranked 26th in the NBA in pace last year, 28th the season before and 27th in 2007. And because it’s highly effective to let Tim Duncan isolate on the left wing, fake two jab steps to his right before banking in a long jumpshot, the Spurs will commit to that instead than a Seven Seconds Or Less offense, rushing up shots as if they had to leave the arena before the car park closed.
Because of all that, they’re considered boring.
It doesn’t help that Duncan has a voice like a bag of spanners. It doesn’t help that the players don’t tend to get up and punch someone after taking a charge. And it doesn’t help that no one associated with the Spurs has a penchant for going out and knifing the occasional groupie (although Jackie Butler had the right idea when he stole that coat). If it was your intention to watch high tempo basketball undertaken by extroverted athletic specimens and occasional petty criminals, this isn’t the team for you.
Even their name, “San Antonio Spurs,” is an anagram of “We’re Really Boring,” give or take a couple of letters. Unfounded or not, this reputation still haunts them.
However, when it comes to their cap management, they’re an interesting franchise. Of course, such a description is used in purely relative terms; we’re talking about things like financial outlooks, tax brackets and performance incentives here, which are collectively about as interesting as a seminar about pondweed. But the Spurs are unashamedly creative when it comes to their cap management, fighting to stay in control of a salary structure that ensures they keep their three stars players without paying the luxury tax. And they’re pretty good at it, too.
You’ll no doubt know already of the Spurs’ history of success in the latter parts of the draft. Picking from the end of each round, the Spurs have managed to find quality players unbecoming of their draft position; Manu Ginobili (57th pick, 1999), Tony Parker (28th pick, 2001), Robertas Javtokas (55th pick, 2001), Luis Scola (55th pick, 2002), Tiago Splitter (28th pick, 2007) and George Hill (26th pick, 2008) all represent terrific value for their low draft positions. Even John Salmons (26th pick, 2002) and Beno Udrih (28th pick, 2004) turned out all right in the end, albeit for someone else. Sure, they’ve made mistakes; Leandro Barbosa was accidentally given away, and Sergei Karaulov is about as much use as a paper condom. But it’s more hit than miss with the Spurs, which is particularly hard to do at the draft’s arse end.
They’re quite creative with signing these players, too. The rookie salary scale does not leave much room for players and teams to negotiate, but there’s room for a little exploitation to go down. Players can sign for as little as 80% of the scale amount, or for as much as 120%, yet nearly every rookie in the league signs for the full 120%. Indeed, the only players not to have done so under this CBA are Sergio Rodriguez (100%), George Hill (120% for the first two years, 80% for the last two) and Ian Mahinmi (all over the show).
Not coincidentally, two of those players are Spurs. With the players having such little leverage in the situation, the Spurs still lowballed the pair, safely in the knowledge that they were the pair’s only path into the NBA. It’s strange, really, that other teams don’t do this, but the Spurs did. Twice. And it worked.
For a lengthier explanation of Hill’s unique salary, and for all current Spurs salaries, visit this.
(Don’t worry about Tiago Splitter, either. A little known rule states that players drafted in the first round that don’t sign within three years of being drafted are no longer bound by the rookie scale; therefore, if the Spurs want to throw some 2010-11 MLE money at Splitter, they can do that.)
Their work extends beyond the draft. San Antonio opened the offseason by obtaining Richard Jefferson for basically nothing at all. The reason they could do that was because of more creative financing. Aware that both players were old and declining, the Spurs took care to include only partial guarantees into the final years of Fabricio Oberto and Bruce Bowen when they signed them through 2010. Those partial guarantees – plus the declining salary of Kurt Thomas, which created another crafty cap asset – served as the delicious Carrots Of Enticement for the Bucks, who prioritised immediate salary savings above anything else and snapped the pair up quickly. The Spurs had obtained themselves a quality player, and given up no significant basketball assets to do it. That’s not easy to do, and it demonstrates the value of unguaranteed contracts.
It’s probably not surprising, then, to know that the Spurs have stocked themselves up with some more. Antonio McDyess’s 3 year, $14.58 million contract has only $2.64 mil of $5.22 mil guaranteed in the final season, and DeJuan Blair’s 4 year $3.808 million contract featured a partially guaranteed third year and a fully unguaranteed final year. Marcus Haislip’s two year minimum salary contract is fully guaranteed for the first year but fully unguaranteed in the second, and Malik Hairston is under contract to only a $50,000 guarantee right now.
Whatever you make of them as players, they also carry value as assets. Between the four of them, they comprise $7 million more in unguaranteed salary. Whether the Spurs use these savings for themselves or use them as trade assets is yet to be seen, but the fact remains; the Spurs have given themselves options for the future.
Even the trio or Roger Mason, Michael Finley and Matt Bonner have value as trade assets. Useful players they may be, but the three of them also comprise $9.5 million in expiring contracts this summer, a summer in which almost everyone will be trying to save money to try and compete in the strongest free agent market of the decade, full of big name free agents like Brian Cook and Antonio Daniels. You could even add Ian Mahinmi to that, if you wanted. That’s another million. The Spurs themselves will not be in that market; after the Jefferson trade, they have nearly $58 million committed already in 2010 to just 9 players, and the amount of restructuring needed to make them free agent players is not feasible (and also not sensible). Therefore, if they want to take back the salary of a halfway decent player from a team willing to accept losing the basketball side of a trade if they win the financial side, they can do that.
It’s not really that far-fetched; they did it this very summer with Jefferson. And you KNOW teams are hot for Brian Cook.
Of course, the Jefferson trade has committed the Spurs to doing something they have tried to avoid for years; the luxury tax. As things stand today, the Spurs are roughly $10 million over the tax threshold, and with no obvious means of getting under it. This means a roughly $90 million payroll next year for a team normally unwilling to crack $70 million. But getting under the luxury tax is only important if the team’s ownership deems it to be necessary to facilitate further spending, and in this offseason the Spurs have spent regardless of their tax situation. They haven’t shied away after the big Jefferson trade, using their MLE on Antonio McDyess and compiling a full roster of 15. They plugged a big hole on their roster, and a couple of smaller ones, without opening up any new holes in the process.
And if they need to do another big trade next year, with all the above assets, they can.
Through careful planning over the years, San Antonio has been able to compile a competitive team every day for a comparatively cheap price. Without the freedom to join the league’s biggest spenders, the Spurs have had to find a way to stay competitive, yet stay under the tax, while keeping together a three star system. It’s really, really difficult to do. Yet somehow, through some top quality creative financing that would make Otis Smith bludgeon a kitten through jealousy, they’ve always managed to do it.
They’re still doing it. Except now they’re spending too.
